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CREDIT-MONITORING DAMAGES IN CYBERSECURITY
TORT LITIGATION
Vincent R. Johnson'

INTRODUCTION

When someone improperly accesses or discloses an individual's personal information, the subject of that data breach is often at an increased
risk of identity theft.' One way for an affected data subject to guard against
this risk is to subscribe to a credit-monitoring service. In this type of arrangement, a business reviews information, generally on a daily basis, from
one or more of the major credit-reporting agencies.2 When a change in the
data subject's credit history occurs, such as the unauthorized opening of a
new account in the victim's name, the service alerts the data subject.' As a
result, the victim of a data-security breach can take prompt action to minimize the consequences of identity theft and can, perhaps, avoid financial
ruin.4 Remedial steps may include closing an unauthorized account, placing
a fraud alert in a credit-reporting agency's files, freezing distribution of
credit reports, or obtaining a declaratory judgment that the data subject is
the victim of identity theft, which may aid the data subject in dealing with
law enforcement authorities.'
Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law. Yale University, LL.M.; University of
Notre Dame, J.D.; St. Vincent College, B.A., LL.D. Professor Johnson's books include: STUDIES IN
AMERICAN TORT LAW (4th ed. 2009) (with Alan Gunn); MASTERING TORTS: A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO
THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 2009); and ADVANCED TORT LAW: A PROBLEM APPROACH (2010).
1 See generally Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 256-57 (2005) (discussing the potential adverse consequences of database
intrusion). The fact that data disclosure increases the risk of identity theft is so well established that
some defendants do not contest the issue. See Rowe v. UniCare Life & Health Ins. Co., No. 09 C 2286,
2010 WL 86391, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2010) (noting that the defendants responsible for personal information being temporarily available on the Internet did "not seem to challenge whether Rowe and the
purported class members were put at a 'substantial risk' of identity theft or some other harm").
2 See
Credit Monitoring Services:
A
Comparison, AAACREDITGUIDE.COM,
http://aaacreditguide.com/credit-monitoring-services/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2011).
3 See id.
4 See Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1008 (N.H. 2003) ("Victims of identity theft
risk the destruction of their good credit histories. This often destroys a victim's ability to obtain credit
from any source and may, in some cases, render the victim unemployable or even cause the victim to be
incarcerated."); see also Guillermo Contreras, Key Figure Admits Guilt in Huge ID Theft Case, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 6, 2011, at 2B (indicating that victims of identity theft found it hard to
get loans and faced "lingering headaches in trying to straight[en] things out").
5 See Johnson, supra note 1, at 259-61 (discussing remedial and preventive options); see also
James Graves, Note, "Medical" Monitoring for Non-Medical Harms: Evaluating the Reasonable Ne-
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Credit-monitoring services will not detect the unauthorized use of existing accounts or types of data misuse unrelated to credit,' such as fraudulent presentation of credentials to obtain employment or medical care.'
However, credit monitoring is particularly useful in detecting the opening
of new accounts in the victim's name, which is an especially potent form of
identity theft.
Recently, potential cybersecurity defendants have provided creditmonitoring services to affected data subjects voluntarily.' In addition,
courts have approved credit-monitoring compensation as part of classaction settlements"o and sanctioned defendants by requiring them to provide
credit monitoring or to reimburse the costs of such services." These developments demonstrate that credit-monitoring expenditures are both reasonable and necessary when a serious breach of data security occurs. 2
As this Article shows, compensation for credit monitoring is both analogous to court awards for medical monitoring 3 and justified under ordinary tort principles. Furthermore, the economic-loss rule 4 should not bar
recovery of credit-monitoring damages because the data-protection obligations imposed by state and federal data-security laws are not a proper subject for private bargaining. Indeed, courts have held that such agreements
are against public policy." If a data possessor negligently and seriously
breaches cybersecurity, an affected data subject should be able to recover
the resulting costs of credit monitoring regardless of whether identity theft
ever occurs.
By requiring data possessors to cover credit-monitoring costs, courts
will deter breaches of cybersecurity. Data possessors will have an incentive
to implement reasonable precautions to guard against unauthorized data
access and to avoid unnecessarily risky practices related to the handling and
cessity ofMeasures to Avoid Identity FraudAfter a Data Breach, 16 RICH. J.L. & TECH. I, IT 71-78, at
50-56 (2009) (discussing credit freezes and fraud alerts); see also 112 AM. JUR. Trials § 19 (2009)
(discussing specific steps a lawyer should take in representing a victim of credit monitoring); Tim Trainor, Hard to Prevent Identify Theft, MONT. STANDARD, Dec. 19, 2010, at A2 (stating that, in Montana,
persons can "fill out an identity theft passport that proves to creditors and law enforcement officers that
someone has used a victim's identity to commit fraud").
6 See Graves, supra note 5, 170, at 50 (discussing some of the problems with credit-monitoring
services).
7 See id. 53, at 36 (distinguishing between "new account fraud, existing account fraud, and nonfinancial fraud").
8 FightingBack Against Identity Theft, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/
microsites/idtheft/consumers/about-identity-theft.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2011).
9 See infra Part II.B.
10 See infra Part II.C.
11 See infra Part II.D.
12 See infra Part II.E.
13 See infra Part Ill.
14 See infra Part I.C.2.
15 See infra Part I.C.2.
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storing of digital personal information." Moreover, judicial recognition of
this element of damages will tend to reduce the costs of cyber-related losses
by shifting credit-monitoring costs to cheaper cost avoiders and spreading
data-protection costs to the classes of people who benefit from commercial
use of computerized personal information." Thus, treating creditmonitoring damages as compensable is not only consistent with basic legal
principles and established tort theories but also supported by several principles of public policy that have played a major role in shaping contemporary American tort law.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the importance of credit
monitoring and of tort claims related to cybersecurity. It also discusses the
duty to protect digital personal information and to disclose breaches of cybersecurity, as well as the reasons why the economic loss rule should not
bar claims for the costs of credit monitoring. Part II of this Article discusses
the precedent dealing with credit-monitoring damages, related business
practices, class-action settlements, and judicial and administrative sanctions. Part III explores the issue of whether credit-monitoring damages are
analogous to the medical-monitoring damages that many states award to
victims of toxic exposure. Part IV then considers arguments against the
compensability of credit-monitoring damages in cybersecurity lawsuits.
These include the alleged lack of present injury in cases where the plaintiff
has not experienced identity theft and the ability of potential plaintiffs to
self-protect against economic harm by purchasing credit-monitoring services. Part V then explains why courts should allow victims of data-security
breaches to recover compensation for the costs of credit monitoring. The
Article argues that protection from identity theft should be as widespread as
commercial use of computerized personal information and that businesses
should be required to internalize the costs of their negligent data practices.
In many instances, businesses are well-situated to efficiently spread identity
theft prevention costs among those who benefit from the use of computerized personal information. Finally, this Article concludes that plaintiffs
should be able to recover credit-monitoring costs often in cybersecurity
litigation.
I.

UNCERTAIN COMPENSABILITY

Credit monitoring has become not only a common method of protecting the security of personal information but also a common claim for damages in tort litigation. This Part discusses how credit monitoring is both
affordable and effective. It provides an overview of the starting assumptions related to any discussion of whether credit-monitoring damages are
16 See infra Part V.A.
17 See infra Part V.B.
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recoverable in cybersecurity cases. Those assumptions relate to the duty to
protect data and disclose breaches of security and to the economic-loss rule.
A.

Issue of WidespreadImportance

Basic credit monitoring is not expensive," at least when it concerns
only one individual.' 9 However, breaches of database security (sometimes
called "cybersecurity") occur frequently20 and often affect thousands,2 or
even millions,22 of persons.23 This is especially true in cases of unauthorized
18 Comparison of Credit Monitoring Services, KNOWZY (June 22, 2011, 7:43 PM),
http://www.knowzy.com/credit-monitoring-comparison.htm (showing that credit-monitoring costs can
range from $8.95 to $29.95 per month). But see David Lazarus, Spend the $15 a Month on Debts, Not on
an Online Debt Organizer, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2011, at BI ("[I]f your problem is that you owe businesses too much money . .. you can probably live without daily credit monitoring .... .").
19 Experian's "Triple Alert" credit-monitoring service, which sells for $8.95 per month, bills itself
as the "most affordable credit monitoring product on the market today." TRIPLEALERT.COM,
https://www.experiandirect.com/triplealert/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). Other more expensive forms of credit monitoring, such as Experian's Triple Advantage product, bundle reports based on
daily review of the three major credit-reporting agencies with other benefits. Triple Advantage "monitors a person's credit files, sends email alerts of suspicious activity, and allows a person to check their
credit reports." In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 3:08-MD-01998,
2009 WL 5184352, at *8 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 22, 2009). "The Experian Guarantee guarantees the 'Triple
Advantage' product up to $1 million for identity theft losses." Id.; see also David Christianson, Monitoring Your Credit's Health, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Jan. 7, 2011, at B4 (placing the cost of credit
monitoring at $15 per month, including identity theft insurance); Daniel Wolfe, Regions Offers $5 AntiFraud Services, AM. BANKER, Jan. 28, 2011, at 10 (stating that for five dollars per month, Regions
Financial Corp. offers "credit monitoring, real-time transaction monitoring for up to 10 payment cards,
and up to $2,500 in identity theft insurance. The card-monitoring service alerts consumers of potentially
fraudulent activity within 24 hours of its occurrence"). Some lawsuits involve claims where plaintiffs
seek to recover the costs of credit monitoring but also the cost of insurance against losses that may result
from identity theft. See In re Killian, No. 05-14629-HB, 2009 WL 2927950, at *2 (Bankr. D.S.C. July
23, 2009) (indicating that the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought $25.00 per month for credit-monitoring
services where the cost included "insurance to cover the cost of any actual identity theft that may occur
while the credit monitoring services are in place" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
20 Two sites compile up-to-date lists of security breaches, ChronologyofData Breaches, PRIVACY
RTs. CLEARINGHOUSE (Sept. 18, 2011), http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach, and Data Breaches,
IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.idtheficenter.org/artman2/publish/lib survey/
ITRC 2008 Breach List.shtml (last visited Sept. 13, 2011) (including data from 2005-2011).
21 See Paul v. Providence Health Sys.-Or., 240 P.3d 1110, 1112 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (discussing
the theft from a car of computerized disks and tapes containing unencrypted records relating to 365,000
patients); Samara Kalk Derby, UW Warns 60,000 of Card Data Theft, WIS. ST. J., Dec. 10, 2010, at A7
(discussing the hacking of the identification card information of tens of thousands of former students,
faculty, and staff members, which placed social security numbers at risk).
22 See John Markoff, Hackers Said to Breach Google Password System, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20,
2010, at Al (discussing the breach of a password system that "controls access by millions of users
worldwide to almost all of [Google's] Web services").
23 See generally Jane E. Kirtley, Privacy Protection,Safety and Security, in 2 COMM UNICATIONS
LAW INTHE DIGITAL AGE 2010, at 15, 29-31 (2010) (discussing "a list of notable data breaches"); Jane
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intrusions into the data held by credit card issuers,24 Mortgage25 and studentloan 26 lenders, universities,27 banks, 28 online marketers, 29 and large employers." In such instances, credit-monitoring expenditures can cost millions of
dollars.' Thus, it is not surprising that some businesses and other defendants charged with negligent failure to protect personal data or to reveal
information concerning unauthorized access have disclaimed responsibility
for the costs of credit monitoring. 32 On the other hand, plaintiffs in cybersecurity cases often argue that defendants are responsible for such amounts
and for other expenses as well."
Whether plaintiffs can recover the costs of credit monitoring in tort actions is important for a variety of reasons, including whether qualified

counsel is willing to represent affected persons in class action litigation. It
is usually difficult for at-risk data subjects to prove that defendants are re-

K. Winn, Recent Developments in the Emerging Law of Information Security, 38 UCC L.J. 391, 400-02
(2006) (discussing numerous data security breaches).
24 See, e.g., In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 395, 397 (D. Mass.
2008)
(involving 45 million credit cardholders).
25 See In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 3:08-MD-01998, 2009
WL 5184352, at *9 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 22, 2009) (discussing a data security breach that affected more than
10 million persons).
26 See Student Loan Company: Data on 3.3M People Stolen, FOXNEWS.COM (Mar. 26, 2010),
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/03/26/student-loan-company-data-m-people-stolen/ [hereinafter Data
on 3.3M People Stolen] (indicating that the stolen data of more than 3 million borrowers, located on
"portable media," included names, addresses, Social Security numbers, and dates of birth (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
27 See, e.g., Derby, supranote 21 (discussing the University of Wisconsin-Madison).
28 See Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 08 Civ. 6060(RMB)(RLE), 2010
WL
2643307, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010) (discussing the loss of computer back-up tapes allegedly
containing information relating to 12.5 million individuals).
29 See Editorial, Who Really Sent That E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2011, at A24 (discussing the
theft of names and e-mail addresses of customers of some of the nation's largest businesses, and the risk
that those customers would be vulnerable to "sophisticated identity-theft ploys" such as "spear phishing").
30 See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010) (involving the unencrypted data of 97,000 employees).
31 See, e.g., In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 3:08-MD-01998,
2010 WL 3341200, at *9 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 23, 2010) (placing the cost of credit monitoring in a class
action at "$37 per person," or $7 million); see also Andreas Antonopoulos, Security Predictionsfor
2011, NETWORK WORLD, Dec. 20, 2010, at 16 ("[J]ust buying credit monitoring and sending letters to
the 500,000 people whose identities you lost can cost tens of millions of dollars and wipe out your
business.").
32 See Stollenwerk v. Tri-W. Health Care Alliance, 254 F. App'x 664, 665 (9th Cir. 2007).
3 For example, in Saenz v. Kaiser Permanente International,the plaintiff alleged that "she and
members of the class have suffered economic damages, including the costs of obtaining identity theft
insurance, professional credit monitoring, cancelling and obtaining new credit and debit cards, as well as
fees for freezing and unfreezing bank and credit accounts." No. C 09-5562, 2010 WL 668038, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2010).
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sponsible for losses such as emotional distress34 or increased risks of future
harm." And, until identity theft occurs, other types of damage resulting
from data exposure may be modest in amount.36 Thus, credit-monitoring
losses may form the lion's share of potentially recoverable damages in a
dispute with an allegedly negligent database possessor.
B.

Tort Claims Related to Cybersecurity

Credit-monitoring damages may be sought in non-cybersecurity cases,
such as disputes arising when a creditor makes an erroneous report to credit-reporting agencies" or when a credit-reporting agency sells a credit report to a third person without a "permissible purpose."" Compensation for
the costs of credit monitoring is also sometimes sought under non-tort theories of liability." Moreover, some judicial opinions use the phrase "credit

34 See Paul v. Providence Health Sys.-Or., 240 P.3d 1110, 1116-20 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (denying
recovery of emotional distress damages in a case arising from the theft of unencrypted records relating
to hundreds of thousands of patients from a car). But see Rowe v. UniCare Life & Health Ins. Co.,
No. 09 C 2296, 2010 WL 86391, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2010) (allowing a claim for severe emotional
distress damages to proceed).
35 See Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1021 (D. Minn. 2006).
[Plaintiffs] overlook the fact that their expenditure of time and money was not the result of
any present injury, but rather the anticipation of future injury that has not materialized. In
other words, the plaintiffs' injuries are solely the result of perceived risk of future harm.
Plaintiffs have shown no present injury or reasonably certain future injury to support damages for any alleged increased risk of harm.
Id. But see Rowe, 2010 WL 86391, at *6 (holding, in a case based on inadvertent posting of personal
information on the Internet, that the plaintiff could "collect damages based on the increased risk of
future harm he incurred, but only if he can show that he suffered from some present injury beyond the
mere exposure of his information to the public").
36 Cf In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 395, 400 (D. Mass. 2008) (explaining that a settlement allowed compensation for the cost of replacing driver's licenses, "out-ofpocket expenses," and "lost time").
37 See, e.g., Wang v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (indicating that, in a controversy based on the defendant's reporting of debts to credit-reporting agencies
without also disclosing that such debts were disputed or that the applicable statutes of limitations barred
the courts from enforcing the debts, the plaintiff sought compensation for "forced purchase of credit
reports and credit monitoring," as well as other expenses).
38 E.g., Daniels v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. CV 109-017, 2010 WL 331690, at *2 (S.D.
Ga. Jan. 19, 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (recounting that the plaintiff demanded "free
credit monitoring for one year").
39 See Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 782 & n.6 (W.D. Mich.
2006) (denying recovery of creditor-monitoring damages based on breach of contract or violation of the
Michigan Consumer Protection Act, and expressly noting that no claim for negligence had been asserted
and that, therefore, an earlier case, which had allowed recovery of credit-monitoring damages, was
"neither applicable nor persuasive").
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monitoring" in ways that have nothing to do with tracking the credit of individuals' or that are unrelated to recovery of damages for such services.4 '
This Article is concerned with the compensability of credit-monitoring
costs only in tort cases involving cybersecurity issues. This range of conduct includes failing to protect data from unauthorized access; negligently42
or intentionally43 disclosing or transferring personal information (such as
via postings on the Internet, e-mail correspondence, or attachments to court
filings"); and, neglecting to inform data subjects that the security of their
personal data has been compromised.
C.

StartingAssumptions
1.

Duty to Protect and Disclose Breaches

This Article assumes arguendo that a data processor has a duty to protect the personal information of others from unauthorized access or revelation and to disclose information about a known breach of data security to
the affected data subjects. These duties are rooted in common law principles;45 in the terms of, or public policies reflected in, the security-breach
notification laws and other provisions that numerous states have passed;'
40 See, e.g., Aerotel, Ltd. v. Telco Grp., Inc., No. 1:04-cv-10292-RJH-FM, 2010
WL 1916015,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2010) (discussing, in a patent infringement suit, "credit monitoring" and prepayment features related to telephone systems).
41 See Scandaglia v. Transunion Interactive, Inc., No. 09 C 2121, 2010 WL 3526653, at *5-8
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2010) (containing an incidental reference to "credit monitoring" in a service mark
infringement action); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. RCA Credit Servs., LLC, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1332 n.20
(M.D. Fla. 2010) (referring to "credit monitoring" in a Federal Trade Commission enforcement action).
42 See, e.g., Rowe v. UniCare Life & Health Ins. Co., No. 09 C 2286, 2010 WL 86391, at *1-2
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2010) (involving a variety of claims brought by insurance plan members whose personal information was temporarily accessible to the public on the Internet).
43 See generally 1-800-E. W. Mortg. Co. v. Bournazian, No. 09CV2123, 2010 WL 3038962
(Mass. Super. Ct. July 18, 2010) (awarding credit-monitoring damages in an action alleging conversion,
breach of contract, and breach of loyalty against a former employee who improperly took and then
unlawfully deleted highly confidential personal information of sixty-eight employees).
44 See, e.g., In re Maple, 434 B.R. 363, 369, 376-77 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010) (declining to dismiss,
in a suit arising from a creditor's filing of a claim in bankruptcy litigation that improperly reveals personal information, certain state-law claims seeking compensation for emotional distress, credit monitoring, and other damages).
45 See Johnson, supra note 1, at 272-82 (discussing common law principles evidencing a duty to
protect data from unauthorized disclosure); id. at 288-96 (examining basic tort principles that create a
duty to reveal knowledge that data security has been compromised). But see In re Davis, 430 B.R. 902,
909 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2010) (finding that the plaintiff failed to properly allege actions for invasion of
privacy or negligent infliction of emotional distress).
46 See Joseph J. Lazzarotti, The Emergence of State Data Privacy and Security Laws Affecting
Employers, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 483, 489-507 (2008) (discussing state laws that protect data
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and in various other pieces of state47 and federal48 legislation that impose
particular data-security obligations. Courts have enforced these duties in
recent cases,49 although there is authority to the contrary."o

and require notification of breach); see also Johnson, supra note 1, at 263-66, 270-72 (discussing the
duty to protect computerized personal information under state security breach notification laws); id. at
282-87 (examining notification duties imposed by state security breach notification laws). The National
Conference of State Legislatures' list of state laws requiring notice of security breaches can be found at:
State Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 12, 2010),
http://www.ncsl.orgflssuesResearch/TelecommunicationslnformationTechnology/SecurityBreachNotific
ationLaws/tabid/13489/Default.aspx ("Forty-six states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the
Virgin Islands have enacted legislation requiring notification of security breaches involving personal
information."). The Conference's year-by-year list of security breach legislation is available at: Breach
of Information, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/Default.aspx?Tabld= 13481 (last
visited Sept. 20, 2011).
47 See Lazzarotti, supra note 46, at 490-92 (discussing state laws that protect social security numbers). But see Shames-Yeakel v. Citizens Fin. Bank, 677 F. Supp. 2d 994, 996, 1000-09 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(discussing and rejecting, in part, several statutory theories of liability); Paul v. Providence Health Sys.Or., 240 P.3d 1110, 1120-22 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish a claim
under the Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act in a case arising from the theft of unencrypted patient
records).
48

See generally GINA STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY AND

DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS (2010), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/
RL34120_20100128.pdf (discussing the various federal laws that now have provisions or regulations
relating to security and data breaches); Lazzarotti, supra note 46, at 487 (stating that "[t]he federal
government has yet to pass a broad-based data privacy and security statute" and instead has addressed
"specific types of information, in some cases on an industry-by-industry basis"). But see Elizabeth D.
De Armond, A Dearth ofRemedies, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 52 (2008) (arguing that federal enactments,
such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, and the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which purport to protect privacy, fail to achieve their promise). Some authors
have argued the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which imposes data protection obligations on financial institutions, is a proper basis for a civil cause of action. See Anthony E. White, Comment, The
Recognition of a Negligence Cause of Action for. Victims of Identity Theft: Someone Stole My Identity,
Now Who Is Going to Pay for It?, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 847, 865-66 (2005) (discussing a negligence per se
theory of liability). However, at least two courts have rejected that argument. See Davis, 430 BR. at 908
(holding that Gramm-Leach-Bliley does not create a private right of action); In re Matthys, No. 0916585-AJM-13, 2010 WL 2176086, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. May 26, 2010); see also Johnson, supra
note 1, at 268-69 (arguing that Gramm-Leach-Bliley lacks the specificity required to support a negligence per se tort action by a data subject against a financial institution). Applicable provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reflect the importance of protecting personal information from improper access. Rule 5.2 provides in relevant part:
(a) Redacted Filings. Unless the court orders otherwise, in an electronic or paper filing with
the court that contains an individual's social-security number, taxpayer-identification number, or birth date, the name of an individual known to be a minor, or a financial-account
number, a party or nonparty making the filing may include only:
(1) the last four digits of the social-security number and taxpayer-identification number;
(2) the year of the individual's birth;
(3) the minor's initials; and
(4) the last four digits of the financial-account number.
FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a). Exceptions to the general rule on redacted filings are set forth in a different
subsection. See id. 5.2(b).
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In Shames-Yeakel v. Citizens FinancialBank,"' a federal court in Illinois found that "[a] number of courts have recognized that fiduciary institutions have a common law duty to protect their members' or customers' confidential information against identity theft."5 2 When an unknown person
gained access to the bank customers' online accounts and stole thousands of
dollars, the court held that the customers were victims of identity theft.53
The court ruled that the customers had a valid negligence claim against the
bank because it employed only a single-password form of account protection."
Numerous commentators agree that businesses have a duty to prevent
improper access or revelation of personal information and to disclose knowledge of security breaches." Of course, absent proof of duty, a negligence
49 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Linea Latina De Accidentes, Inc., No. 09-3681 (JNE/JJK), 2010 WL
5014386, at *24 (D. Minn. Nov. 24, 2010) (ordering a party whose electronic case filing improperly
disclosed personal information to notify affected individuals of the disclosure and provide twelve
months of credit monitoring free of charge); see also Poli v. Mountain Valleys Health Ctrs., Inc.,
No. 2:05-2015-GEB-KJM, 2006 WL 83378, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2006) (finding that the plaintiff
stated a claim for negligent disclosure of medical information); I-800-E. W. Mortg. Co. v. Bournazian,
No. 09CV2123, 2010 WL 3038962, at *1-3 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 18, 2010) (holding a former employee liable for credit monitoring and other damages in a case arising from the improper removal of
confidential employee information); Bell v. Mich. Council 25 of Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun.
Emps., No. 246684, 2005 WL 356306, at *1, *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2005) (per curiam) (holding a
union liable for identity theft damages resulting from the union's failure to safeguard members' personal
information). Of course, liability may be imposed for failure to safeguard data in hard copy form. See
Scott v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., No. A05-649, 2006 WL 997721, at *1, *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 18,
2006) (affirming a judgment imposing liability under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act for
damages resulting from improper disposal of educational records). But see In re Countrywide Fin. Corp.
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 3:08-MD-01998, 2010 WL 3341200, at *6 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 23,
2010) ("[T]he current state of the law in regards to data breaches does not bode well for Plaintiffs. . . . [T]his factor weighs heavily in favor of settlement.").
50 See, e.g., Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting claims for
negligence and breach of contract arising from the theft of a laptop containing unencrypted employee
information); Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 08 CIV 6060(RMB)(RLE), 2010 WL
2643307, at *4, *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010) (finding that no duty was owed to millions of persons
whose personal information was contained on computer back-up tapes that were lost).
51 677 F. Supp. 2d 944 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
52 Id. at 1007-08.
53 Id. at 996-97.
54 Id. at 1008-09; see also Sue Reisinger, How FastIs FastEnough to Tell Customers About Data
Breaches?, CORPORATE COUNSEL (July 25, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=
1202504732096 (discussing a federal court decision holding Comerica Bank liable for data breach
losses).
55 See, e.g., Derek A. Bishop, To Serve and Protect: Do Businesses Have a Legal Duty to Protect
Collections of PersonalInformation?, 3 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 7, 4 (2006) ("Like legislatures,
courts are signaling some willingness to impose a common law duty of care to protect personal information."); Bill Piatt & Paula DeWitte, Loose Lips Sink Attorney-Client Ships: Unintended Technological
Disclosure of Confidential Communications, 39 ST. MARY'S L.J. 781, 815 (2008) ("Attorneys have an
ethical obligation .... to protect data stored electronically from unintended disclosure either through
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claim will fail. In that case, unless there is some other theory of liability, the
courts need not reach the question of what damages plaintiffs may recover
in cybersecurity actions.
2.

Not Barred by the Economic Loss Rule

This Article assumes arguendo that the so-called "economic loss rule"
does not bar recovery of credit-monitoring losses. That rule-if it is a
rule"--is a principle of uncertain dimensions, which holds that, at least in
some circumstances, negligence that causes purely economic losses, without also producing personal injury or property damage, is not actionable in
tort law." The elegant simplicity of the "rule" masks a messier reality because the "rule" is subject to a multitude of well-recognized exceptions. As
noted in a previous article:
Not the least of these qualifications are the causes of action imposing liability for negligent
misrepresentation, defamation, professional malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, nuisance,
loss of consortium, wrongful death, spoliation of evidence, and unreasonable failure to settle
a claim within insurance policy limits, all of which may afford recovery for negligence caus58
ing purely economic losses to the plaintiff.

In large measure, the economic loss rule is intended to further the private ordering of business transactions." However, data-security statutes in
inadvertent release of the information or from failure to secure the data against unauthorized
access.. .. [and] must act reasonably to prevent, detect, and remedy security breaches."); see also Lori
J. Parker, Cause ofAction for Identity Theft, in 31 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d, at 1, 23-25 (2006) (discussing
theories of liability); Jennifer A. Chandler, Negligence Liability for Breaches of Data Security, 23
BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 223, 244-62 (2008) (discussing developments in Canada); Paul M. Schwartz &
Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 923-25 (2007) (discussing tort liability).
56 Professor Oscar S. Gray, an eminent torts scholar, has expressed doubts about whether there is a
single, unified economic loss rule. He wrote that:
I had not previously thought that there was any such thing as a single "economic loss rule."
Instead, I had thought that there was a constellation of somewhat similar doctrines that tend
to limit liability, in the case of purely economic loss, from what might have been expected
under Palsgrafin the case of physical loss. These doctrines seemed to work in somewhat different ways in different contexts, for similar but not necessarily identical reasons, with exceptions where the reasons for limiting liability were absent.
Oscar S. Gray, Some Thoughts on "The Economic Loss Rule" and Apportionment, 48 ARIZ. L. REV.
897, 898 (2006) (footnote omitted).
57 See Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 523, 524-34 (2009) (discussing the rule and its exceptions).
58 Id. at 530-32 (footnotes omitted) (containing abundant citations to primary authority).
59 See Flagstaff Affordable Hous. Ltd. P'ship v. Design Alliance, Inc., 223 P.3d 664, 671 (Ariz.
2010) (en banc) ("The principal function of the economic loss doctrine, in our view, is to encourage
private ordering of economic relationships and to uphold the expectations of the parties by limiting a
plaintiff to contractual remedies for loss of the benefit of the bargain."); see also Jay M. Feinman, The
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many states hold that private agreements disclaiming legislatively imposed
obligations related to computerized personal information are not enforceable and are void as against public policy.' Consequently, the duties at issue
in cybersecurity cases are, in large measure, not a proper subject for private
ordering. For this reason, and for other reasons that have been explored
elsewhere,"1 the economic loss rule should not foreclose recovery of creditmonitoring damages.62 However, in Paul v. Providence Health SystemOregon63 an Oregon appellate court has ruled to the contrary. In that case, a
thief stole unencrypted patients' records from the defendant's employee's
car.' The court held that the patients could not recover pure economic
damages to cover the expenses they incurred by purchasing creditmonitoring services to lower the risk of identity theft."
II.

COURT DECISIONS AND BUSINESS PRACTICES

Not all courts have viewed credit-monitoring damages favorably. This
Part discusses court precedent, which failed to recognize the reasonableness
and value of credit monitoring. It also discusses voluntary offers of credit
monitoring by businesses and governmental entities, and judicial or administrative recognition of credit monitoring as part of class-action settlements
or sanctions.

Economic Loss Rule and Private Ordering,48 ARIz. L. REV. 813, 814 (2006) (discussing the logic of
private ordering).
60 See Johnson, supranote 1, at 300-01. The article explains:
Many state laws, such as the Rhode Island Identity Theft Protection Act of 2005, provide
that a waiver of the data subjects' rights is against public policy, and therefore void and unenforceable. If that is true, it makes little sense that consumers should bargain and pay for the
level of cybersecurity protection-and the right to sue for out-of-pocket damages-that they
desire. Moreover, it is simply unrealistic to expect that bargaining to occur between individual consumers and the large corporations that play a pervasive role in modem life.
Id. at 300 (footnotes omitted).
61 See id. at 296-303 (discussing the policy concerns that animate the economic loss rule: scope of
liability, certainty of damages, and delineation of contract-versus-tort).
62 See Johnson, supra note 57, at 532 (discussing various causes of actions where damages are not
barred by the economic loss rule). But see Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 406 F. App'x 129, 131-32 (9th
Cir. 2010) (finding it unnecessary to determine whether the economic loss rule barred an award of
credit-monitoring damages because the plaintiffs failed to allege their negligence and breach of contract
claims sufficiently).
63 240 P.3d 1110 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
6 Id.at1112.
65

Id. at 1 116.
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Adverse Decisions

Although some courts have ordered defendants to provide creditmonitoring services' or pay credit-monitoring damages,' a number of cases have held that credit-monitoring damages are not recoverable in cybersecurity tort actions." With scant attention to the reasonableness or usefulness
of credit monitoring as a response to database intrusion and as a means of
mitigating damages, these courts concluded that, at least on certain facts,
such expenditures are not compensable.69
The decisions that are adverse to recovery of compensation for creditmonitoring expenses generally fall into three categories, which are discussed later in this Article.70 First, some cases have rejected the plaintiffs'
efforts to analogize credit monitoring to medical monitoring." This is significant because many states allow plaintiffs to recover compensation for
the medical examinations that are necessary to detect the emergence of a
diseased condition caused by toxic exposure.72 Data exposure and toxic

66 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Linea Latina De Accidentes, Inc., No. 09-3681 (JNE/JJK), 2010 WL
5014386, at *24 (D. Minn. Nov. 24, 2010) (involving an electronic case filing that improperly disclosed
personal information).
67 See 1-800-E. W. Mortg. Co. v. Boumazian, No. 09CV2123, 2010 WL 3038962, at *1-3 (Mass.
Super. Ct. July 18, 2010) (involving improper removal of confidential employee information).
68 See, e.g., Shafran v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 01365(GBD), 2008 WL 763177, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. March 20, 2008) (holding that "the time and expense of credit monitoring to combat an
increased risk of future identity theft is not, in itself, an injury that the law is prepared to remedy").
Pisciottav. Old National Bancorp held that credit-monitoring costs were not compensable under Indiana
law. 499 F.3d 629, 635-39 (7th Cir. 2007). However, Pisciotta was a narrow decision. Id. at 636. As
described by another court in a later case, "[a]fter an in-depth analysis of Indiana law, the appellate
court [in Pisciotta] upheld the decision [denying credit-monitoring damages] because there was no
precedent supportive of the opposite conclusion and federal courts sitting in diversity should avoid
inventing truly novel tort claims on behalf of a state." Rowe v. UniCare Life & Health Ins. Co.,
No. 09 C 2296, 2010 WL 86391, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2010).
69 Some cases contain no analytical discussion, but merely a brief citation to an earlier decision
denying recovery of credit-monitoring damages. See In re Barnhart, No. 09-bk-01974, 2010 WL
724703, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. Feb. 26, 2010) (dicta).
70 See infra Part III, IV.
71 See Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 908, 913-14 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (finding that the lack of
any public health interest differentiates lost data and medical-monitoring cases), af'd, 380 F. App'x 689
(9th Cir. 2010); see also Caudle v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 273, 280-81
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that New York's interest in the public health was greater than the availability
of a money remedy for an individual whose stolen information is later misused); Kahle v. Litton Loan
Servicing LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705, 712-13 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (finding that "identity exposure" cases and
medical-monitoring cases are not analogous (internal quotation marks omitted)); Key v. DSW Inc., 454
F. Supp. 2d 684, 689 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (finding that a victim of identity theft has not suffered recoverable harm as has a victim in the medical-monitoring context).
72 See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 849-52 (3d Cir. 1990) (differentiating
compensation for medical monitoring from compensation for the increased risk of future harm and
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exposure are analogous in that they both create a need for early detection of
potentially emerging, threatened harm. Second, some decisions have denied
recovery of credit-monitoring damages on the ground that the plaintiff has
not suffered a present injury but has merely been exposed to a risk of harm
in the future." Finally, in the third group of cases, the courts declined to
award credit-monitoring damages because the plaintiffs lacked standing to
litigate that issue in federal court.74
B.

Voluntary Offers of Credit Monitoring

Rather than definitively resolving issues relating to credit-monitoring
costs, recent developments have called decisions denying recovery into
question. The. first of these occurrences relates to business practices. Recognizing the appropriateness of expenditures on credit monitoring," database possessors potentially responsible for unauthorized access to data often voluntarily offer to pay credit-monitoring costs for affected persons for
a period of time." Thus, when Wyndham Hotels and Resorts learned that a
allowing the recovery of medical-monitoring damages under Pennsylvania law covering "only the
quantifiable costs of periodic medical examinations necessary to detect the onset of physical harm").
7 See infra Part IV.A; see also In re Killian, No. 05-14629-HB, 2009 WL 2927950, at *8-9
(Bankr. D.S.C. July 23, 2009). Killian was not the typical cybersecurity case. The court did not charge
the defendant with failing to protect data from unauthorized access. Rather, the complaint alleged that
the defendant "intentionally communicated or otherwise made the Killians' sensitive and personal
nonpublic information available to the public by placing that information on the Court's public records."
Id at *2. The court found that there was "ample legal authority to support a claim that Defendant had a
duty to refrain from placing the Killians' personal information on the public record." Id. at *8. However,
the court rejected the plaintiff's negligence claim on the ground that the complaint failed to allege compensable damages. The court reasoned:
The Court must be able to find that the allegations of the Complaint allege an injury that is to
accrue in thefuture. In this case, the Killians' complaint simply alleges that the cost of credit
monitoring, which is a preventative remedy, will accrue in the future.
Id. at *9 (citation omitted).
74 See, e.g., Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 08 CIV 6060(RMB)(RLE), 2010 WL
2643307, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010) (holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing because "their
claims are future-oriented, hypothetical, and conjectural"); see also infra Part IV.A.3.
75 Even though expenditures on credit-monitoring damages are a reasonable means of mitigating
the damages that can flow from authorized access to personal information, there is evidence that many
consumers are unaware or unconvinced of those benefits. In In re TJX Cos. Retail Securities Breach
Litigation, 584 F. Supp. 2d 395 (D. Mass. 2008), the court noted that only about three percent of eligible
persons claimed that the credit-monitoring benefit was part of a database intrusion settlement. Id. at 406.
76 See, e.g., Rowe v. UniCare Life & Health Ins. Co., No. 09 C 2286, 2010 WL 86391, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 5, 2010) (stating that the defendants responsible for making personal information temporarily
available on the Internet "offered to provide one year of credit monitoring to those affected"). In Taylor
v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. 08-CV-13258, 2010 WL 750215 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 3, 2010), the
defendant, whose "former employee may have sold unauthorized information about plaintiffs to a third
party," offered the plaintiffs "a two-year membership in Triple Advantage (a credit monitoring service)
to help plaintiffs protect their credit." Id. at *12. Ultimately, the court rejected the plaintiffs' vicarious
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sophisticated hacker penetrated its computer system and may have used
customer information to perpetrate fraudulent transactions, it provided affected customers with credit monitoring for one year at no cost.77 Similarly,
Countrywide Financial volunteered to provide two years of credit monitoring to millions of persons as a result of a security breach related to their
mortgage loans."
In another controversy, a company that guaranteed federal student
loans notified 3.3 million persons that their data had been stolen and
promptly "arranged with credit protection agency Experian to provide affected borrowers with free credit monitoring and protection services."" In
addition, the University of Louisville,so Harley-Davidson,"' the St. Louis
Metropolitan Police Department,82 Tulane University,83 the Bank of New

liability claim related to the conduct of the former employee because "plaintiffs have admhitted that they
have suffered no monetary damages nor any impact on their credit report resulting from the possible
(and unconfirmed) theft of any of their personal information by the former Countrywide employee.
Without any damages, this claim . . . must fail." Id. at *13; see also Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628
F.3d 1139, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2010) (indicating that the court ordered a thief to provide 97,000 employees with one year of credit monitoring); TJX, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 400 (discussing a settlement that
provided affected customers with three years of credit monitoring).
77 Letter from Wyndham Hotels & Resorts to Vincent Johnson (June 2010) (on file with author);
see also Saenz v. Kaiser Permanente Int'l, No. C 09-5562 PJH, 2010 WL 668038, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
19, 2010) (indicating that the defendants "offered plaintiff and putative members of the class one year of
professional credit monitoring through Equifax as a remedy for the security breach" but that the plaintiff
maintained that the offer was inadequate).
78 See In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 3:08-MD-01988, 2009
WL 5184352, at *8-9 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 22, 2009) (discussing the offer, which some class members accepted and the subsequent settlement, which the court preliminarily approved). The court stated that
"[a]pproximately 20% of the 2.4 million [persons initially contacted] accepted Countrywide's first offer
of free credit monitoring." Id. at *11.
79 Data on 3.3MPeople Stolen, supra note 26. According to a news report published within one
week of the theft, "[b]orrowers will be receiving letters ... on how to sign up, gain access to fraud
resolution representatives, and be provided with identity theft insurance coverage." Id.
80 Kirtley, supra note 23, at 29 (discussing a university's disclosure in June 2010 that patient
information was posted on the Internet for twenty months and indicating that the university "immediately apologized for the breach, notified the patients or their next of kin, and agreed to pay a credit monitoring agency to watch the affected patients' credit for a year").
81 See Shafran v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 01365(GBD), 2008 WL 763177, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2008) (indicating that one year of free credit monitoring was provided to thousands
of persons whose personal information was on a lost laptop).
82 Kirtley, supra note 23, at 30-31 (indicating that after the department was "the victim of a cyberattack" in 2010, which an employee facilitated by opening an e-mail, "[t]he department said it would
work to contact the affected parties and would pay to monitor their credit for a year").
83 John Pope, Tulane Payroll Information Stolen, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 8, 2011, at B6 (indicating that when a "laptop containing payroll and Social Security information for every full-time and parttime university employee" was stolen, "[e]ach of Tulane's 10,684 employees . . . received a letter . .. offering a year's free credit monitoring of their accounts").
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York Mellon," Ceridien Corporation," Ohio State University," Holy Cross
Hospital (Ft. Lauderdale),8 7 the University of Utah," Wachovia Securities,"
and other potential defendants have made comparable offers voluntarily.
When hackers stole the personal information of millions of PlayStation
garners, Senator Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut called on Sony to provide affected customers with "financial data security services, including
free access to credit reporting services."' Sony responded by offering a
year of free credit monitoring to victims of the breach."
In Texas, the state left unencrypted information relating to 3.5 million
persons on an Internet server for more than a year.92 Despite a pending government financial crisis," the Texas Comptroller announced that affected
individuals would receive one year of free credit monitoring.'

See Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 08 Civ. 6060(RMB)(RLE), 2010 WL
2643307, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010) (noting that a bank that lost computer back-up tapes voluntarily offered affected individuals, at "no cost .. . a minimum of 24 months of credit monitoring, $25,000 of
identity theft insurance ... [and] reimbursement for certain credit freeze costs").
85 Reilly v. Ceridien Corp., No. 10-5142 (JLL), 2011 WL 735512 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2011) (indicating that one year of free credit monitoring was provided to victims of a security breach caused by hacking).
86 Encarnacion Pyle, Server Hacked at OSU; 760,000 Affected, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio),
Dec. 16, 2010, at Al (stating that although there was "no indication that any personal information was
taken or that the incident will result in identity theft for any of the affected people," the university offered twelve months of free credit-monitoring services as a precaution).
87 Jon Burstein, FormerHoly Cross Hospital Employee Pleads Guilty to ID Theft, Faces up to 10
Years in Prison, SUN SENTINEL (Fla.), Jan. 27, 2011, at 3B (indicating that one year of credit monitoring
was offered to 44,000 emergency room patients after a hospital employee improperly accessed 1,500
patient files).
88 Colo. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Perpetual Storage, Inc., No. 2:10CV316 DAK, 2011 WL 1231832, at *1
(D. Utah Mar. 30, 2011) (indicating that the university provided credit monitoring to affected patients
when a company failed to "to safeguard computer back-up tapes containing highly confidential and
sensitive medical records and other data").
89 Giordano v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, No. 06-476 (JBS), 2006 WL 2177036, at *1 (D.N.J. July 31,
2006) (offering one year of free credit monitoring after a list with thousands of social security numbers
and other identifying information was lost in the mail).
90 Nick Bilton & Brian Stelter, Sony Says PlayStation Hacker Got PersonalData, N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr. 27, 2011, at BI.
91 Free Credit Monitoringfor Sony PlayStation Breach Victims, WASH. ST. OFF. Arr'Y GEN.
(May 27, 2011,
11:21 AM), http://www.atg.wa.gov/BlogPost.aspx?id=28174
(linking to
http://us.playstation.com/news/consumeralerts/identity-theft-protection/).
92 Patricia Kilday Hart, Comptroller Takes Blame for Personal Data Leak, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 29, 2011, at IA (indicating that the State replaced an offer of discounted credit
monitoring with free credit monitoring).
93 Dave Mann, Youth Movement, TEX. OBSERVER, Apr. 8, 2011, at 4 ("Each day seemingly brings
unrelenting bad news from every corner of state policy, with lawmakers facing a fiscal crisis and considering drastic budget cuts to education, health care, criminal justice, nearly everything.").
94 Dave Montgomery, Comptroller "Really Sorry" for Records Breach, FORT WORTH STARTELEGRAM, Apr. 29, 2011, at 1B.
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One recent publication from the insurance field remarked in an article
about managing cyber risk that "[i]f identity theft or fraud is possible due to
a breach, many organizations offer free credit monitoring for as long as
three years."' Similarly, a report issued by the federal government stated
that "a representative of a large financial management company noted that
offering free credit monitoring services after a breach has become standard
industry practice."96
Class Action Settlements

C.

Many courts have also recently approved class-action settlements in
cybersecurity cases where the parties intended for portions of the settlements to cover the costs of credit monitoring.97 Indeed, when parties settle
aggregate claims, the settlement often encompasses only compensation for
credit monitoring, identify theft insurance, and out-of-pocket costs, such as
expenses incurred to replace checks or drivers' licenses."
For example, in In re TJX Cos. Retail Securities Breach Litigation,' a
federal court in Massachusetts approved an award of $6.5 million in attorneys' fees in a class-action suit arising from the theft of 40 million credit
cardholders' personal information.'" In that suit, which was then the "largest retail security breach in history," 0' the settlement included compensation for credit monitoring and identity theft insurance. Explaining the
court's ruling, the judge wrote:
The Court .. . is satisfied that the Agreement creates a concrete benefit insofar as it provides
that [customers returning merchandise without a receipt] could receive credit monitoring services.... The parties ... determined with certainty the value, in the form of the cost of the
credit monitoring subscription, that would be transferred to each unreceipted return customer
who made a claim. Therefore, unlike the figures attached to other benefits-for which it was
unclear how many class members, if any, might qualify and what amount they might claimthe $177,000,000 attributed to this benefit has meaning. Accordingly, the Court is comforta-

95 Learn Strategiesfor Managing Cyber Risk, Bus. INs., Jan. 3, 2011, at 3, 16.
96

U.S. Gov'T

ACCOUNTABILITY

OFFICE,

GAO-07-737,

PERSONAL

INFORMATION:

DATA

BREACHES ARE FREQUENT, BUT IDENTITY THEFT Is LIMITED; HOWEVER, THE FULL EXTENT IS
UNKNOWN 35 (2007) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].

97 See In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 3:08-MD-01998, 2009
WL 5184352, at *8, *12 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 22, 2009) (approving a settlement encompassing credit monitoring, identity theft insurance, and out-of-pocket expenses). But see In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy

Litig., No. 00 C 4729, 2009 WL 4799954, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2009) ("[T]he class here (indeed,
probably most classes) would rather have cash than in-kind relief. A check for $60 is more valuable to
most people than getting free credit monitoring services with a retail value of that amount.").
98 See Countrywide, 2009 WL 5184352, at *8, *12 (approving a settlement encompassing credit
monitoring, identity theft insurance, and out-of-pocket expenses).
9 584 F. Supp. 2d 395 (D. Mass. 2008).
100 Id. at 397, 408.
101 Id. at 397.
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ble characterizing this litigation as creating $177,000,000 in potential benefits for the
class .. . .102

Similarly, in In re Countrywide FinancialCorp. Customer Data Secu3
rity Breach Litigation,"O
a federal court in Kentucky approved a classaction settlement, which included, notably, "[fjree credit monitoring," finding that "the value of this settlement is substantial."" Likewise, in Barel v.
Bank ofAmerica, a federal court in Pennsylvania approved a class-action
settlement that provided non-customers, whose credit reports had been improperly accessed by the defendant, with four months of credit monitoring
and other relief.'" Judicial endorsement of these settlements strongly suggests that credit monitoring is a legitimate form of damages resulting from
exposure of personal information to unauthorized access.
In addition, in cases of data-security breaches, federal law authorizes
the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs to provide individuals
"subject to a reasonable risk for the potential misuse of any sensitive personal information" with "[o]ne year of credit monitoring services consisting
of automatic daily monitoring of at least 3 relevant credit bureau reports."' 7
In a case involving a lost laptop containing the information of 26.5 million
veterans, the National Law Journal reported that money from the U.S.
Treasury would provide compensation for "actual harm, such as physical
symptoms of emotional distress or expenses incurred for credit monitoring. " 08
In another government data-security breach, an FDIC intern improperly used agency information to take out fraudulent loans in the names of
FDIC employees.' The agency reacted by "promptly notifying affected
employees and offering them 2 years of credit monitoring services."'o
D.

JudicialandAdministrative Sanctions

There is other evidence that credit monitoring is an appropriate expenditure. For example, courts and administrative agencies have imposed
sanctions requiring defendants to provide such services to persons at risk of
identity theft due to breaches of data security. In United States v. Ja102

Id. at 409 (footnote omitted).
103 No. 3:08-MD-01998, 2010 WL 3341200 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 23, 2010).
104 Id. at *0.
105 255 F.R.D. 393 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (dealing with the settlement of claims related to improperly
obtained credit reports).
106 Id. at 397.
107 38 C.F.R. § 75.118 (2009).
108 Vets Will Share $20M in Data Privacy Breach, NAT'L L.., Feb. 2, 2009, at 16.
109 GAO REPORT, supra note 96, at 22-23.
110 Id. at 23 n.39.
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nosko,"' the First Circuit ordered a detainee to pay restitution after the court
convicted him of hacking into a prison's computer system.I"2 The award
reimbursed the county for money that it spent on credit-monitoring services
that it offered to employees whose personal information was contained in
the hacked databases."' Retired.Supreme Court Justice David Souter, sitting by designation, found that the county's actions were a reasonable response to the hacking and were, therefore, compensable.114 Justice Souter
wrote:
It should go without saying that an employer whose personnel records have been exposed to
potential identity thieves responds reasonably when it makes enquiry to see whether its employees have been defrauded. This act of responsibility is foreseeable to the same degree that
indifference to employees' potential victimization would be reproachable. It is true, of
course, that once they were told of the security breach, the individual employees and former
workers involved in this case could themselves have made credit enquiries to uncover any
fraud, but this in no way diminishes the reasonableness of the Facility's investigation
prompted by the risk that its security failure created. And quite aside from decency to its
workers, any employer would reasonably wish to know the full extent of criminality when
reporting the facts to law enforcement authorities."'

In another case, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Linea Latina De Accidentes,
Inc.,"' attachments to a litigant's electronic court filing improperly disclosed "birth dates, names of minors, financial account numbers, and at
least one social security number.""' After the litigant failed to remedy the
problem, a federal court in Minnesota ordered the party's counsel to "provide a subscription for 12 months to Experian's Triple Advantage Credit
Monitoring to each individual whose social security number or date of birth
was improperly disclosed, except those individuals who respond in writing . . . that they do not wish to receive the service.""'
Similarly, in Weakley v. Redline Recovery Services, LLC,"9 a federal
court in California found that an attorney had filed documents containing
social security numbers recklessly and in bad faith, and that he made the
documents available on the Internet for more than three weeks. 2 0 The court
111 642F.3d40(lstCir.2011).
112 Id. at 41-42; see also Sheri Qualters, Inmate Who Computer-Hacked Guards Must Pay Restitu.
tion, NAT'L. L.J. (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJjsp?id=1202489772767
(discussing the First Circuit's decision); Sheri Qualters, Should Prison Hacker Payfor Credit Monitoring as Restitution? Ist Circuit to Decide, NAT'L. L.J. (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/
PubArticleNLJjsp?id=1202477328396 (discussing the appeal in United States v. Janosko).
113 Janosko, 642 F.3d at 41.
114 Id.at42.
115

id
116 No. 09-3681 (JNE/JJK), 2010 WL 5014386 (D. Minn. Nov. 24,2010).
117 Id. at *1.
118 Id. at *4.
19 No. 09cvl423 BEN (WMC), 2011 WL 1522413 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 20,2011).
120 Id.at *1-2.
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ordered the responsible attorney to pay for five years of credit monitoring to
protect the plaintiff from identity theft.121
In Connecticut, the state insurance commission fined a health insurer
for a major data-security breach and untimely notification of affected persons.122 The fine was part of an agreement requiring the insurer to provide
two years of free credit monitoring to insureds.123
E.

Indicia ofLegitimacy

As the preceding discussion demonstrates, business practice, litigation
settlement, and judicial and administrative sanction developments, along
with court opinions referencing the utility of credit monitoring, 24 strongly
suggest that expenditures on credit monitoring are prudent and appropriate
when defendants place computerized personal information at risk. To that
extent, plaintiffs should be able to recover such amounts in tort litigation
because those expenditures are reasonably necessary to mitigate the harm
that may flow from a cybersecurity breach. To conclude otherwise would
be to suggest that corporate, judicial, and administrative officials now routinely sanction the waste of resources when they approve voluntary offers,
settlements, fines, or sanctions involving credit-monitoring expenditures.
Moreover, it is easier to justify a legal duty to provide creditmonitoring services when such provision is a customary business practice
in cases of breached data security. 251In such an environment, imposition of
liability for credit-monitoring damages will neither disrupt community
practices nor impose unprecedented obligations. This is important because
121 Id. at *2 (assessing the cost of credit monitoring at $900).
122 Ryan Doran, Privacy Breaches Spell Tighter Controls of Patient Records, FAIRFIELD
COUNTY
Bus. J., Dec. 6, 2010, at 4.
123

Id.

124 See, e.g., Dixon-Rollins v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc.,
No. 09-0646, 2010 WL 3749454,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2010) (indicating that use of a credit-monitoring service revealed the improper
listing of a debt on a credit report); Belmont Holdings Corp. v. Sun Trust Banks, Inc., No. 1:09-cvI I85-WSD, 2010 WL 3545389, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 10, 2010) (stating, in the context. of a securities
law class action, that the plaintiff used "credit monitoring . .. to provide 'early warning' alerts for problem loans in the portfolio"); Saccato v. Gordon, No. 10-6111-HO, 2010 WL 3395295, at *2 (D. Or.
Aug. 26, 2010) (noting that the plaintiffs use of credit monitoring disclosed an allegedly erroneous debt
entry).
125 For instance, in determining whether a defendant breached a duty, courts frequently refer to the
relevant industry practices. See Glow v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1141 (E.D. Cal.
2009) ("It is the jury's duty to consider industry practice and available alternatives as part of its calculus
to determine whether defendant's conduct was negligent."). However, in Rowe v. UniCare Life &
Health Insurance Co., the court stated that the fact that the defendants attempted to mitigate the costs of
credit monitoring by offering free credit monitoring for a year did "not resolve the question of whether
credit monitoring costs are actual damages." No. 09 C 2286, 2010 WL 86391, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5,
2010).
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among the policy considerations relevant to whether a duty should be imposed are the resulting "consequences to the community."1 26
III. ANALOGY TO MEDICAL-MONITORING DAMAGES
According to Professor Dan B. Dobbs, in the personal injury context,
"[n]o rule of law excludes recovery for expenses of diagnosis or limits the
recovery to expenses of treatment."l 27 Moreover, the rule that a party must
prove damages with reasonable certainty "does not, even taken literally,
exclude recovery for expenses of minimizing damages or of determining
the nature and extent of the plaintiffs injury." 28 Consistent with these principles, many states permit toxic-exposure plaintiffs to recover the costs of
medical monitoring.129 As one court noted, "[a] medical monitoring award
aids presently healthy plaintiffs who have been exposed to an increased risk
of future harm to detect and treat any resultant harm at an early stage."'
In Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp.,13 the Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc, made a similar ruling. The Meyer court, discussing an earlier

decision of the Missouri Court of Appeals, Elam v. Alcolac, Inc.,'32 stated:

126
127
128

Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968).
DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 8.1(3), at 651 (2d ed. 1993).

id
129 See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 850 (3d Cir. 1990) (differentiating
compensation for medical monitoring from compensation for the increased risk of future harm and
allowing the recovery of medical-monitoring damages under Pennsylvania law covering "only the
quantifiable costs of periodic medical examinations necessary to detect the onset of physical harm");
Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (holding "that the cost
of medical monitoring is a compensable item of damages where the proofs demonstrate, through reliable
medical expert testimony, that the need for future monitoring is a reasonably certain consequence of a
plaintiffs toxic exposure and that the recommended monitoring is reasonable"). According to the Supreme Court of Nevada:
Since the landmark decision Askey v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 102 A.D.2d 130, 477
N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (1984), in which a New York appeals court acknowledged medical monitoring could be a recoverable damage, appellate courts in at least ten other states have recognized claims for medical monitoring. In addition, federal courts have interpreted state law in
at least seven additional states and the District of Columbia as permitting claims for medical
monitoring.
Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 438 (Nev. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam) (footnote omitted).
But see Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1, 9 (Miss. 2007) (holding that the state
does not recognize medical-monitoring claims in the absence of proof of physical injury); Lowe v.
Philip Morris USA, Inc., 183 P.3d 181, 182 (Or. 2008) (en banc) (holding that a smoker was not entitled
to medical-monitoring damages based on accumulated exposure to cigarette smoke).
130 Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 571 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that the plaintiffs
had standing to seek medical-monitoring damages related to potentially defective implants).
131 220 S.W.3d 712 (Mo. 2007) (en banc).
132 765 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
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The Elam court recognized that among the potential damages sustained by a plaintiff who is
exposed to a toxin is the need for medical monitoring for the "early detection of serious disease from the chronic exposure" to toxins. The court further reasoned that medical monitoring costs are recoverable because "compensation for necessary medical expenses reasonably
certain to be incurred in the future rests on well-accepted legal principles." These "wellaccepted" principles of Missouri law provide that a plaintiff is entitled to recover for the
prospective consequences of the defendant's tortious conduct if the injury is reasonably certain to occur. Recognizing that a defendant's conduct has created the need for future medical
monitoring does not create a new tort. It is simply a compensable item of damage when liability is established under traditional tort theories of recovery.1 33

Jurisdictions vary in how they state the elements of a medicalmonitoring claim. In general:
Recovery of medical monitoring costs requires proof that (1) the plaintiff was exposed to a
toxic substance, (2) the exposure resulted from the defendant's negligence, (3) the exposure
increased the plaintiffs risk of serious disease or illness, (4) there exist beneficial medical
procedures to treat that disease or illness, and (5) those procedures are reasonably neces34
sary.'

For similar reasons, it can be argued that credit monitoring is appropriate when there has been a serious breach of data security. Expenditures
on credit monitoring are necessary to enable the data subject to detect serious kinds of identity theft promptly and take steps to minimize the resulting harm. Indeed, it can be argued that credit monitoring is even more appropriate than medical monitoring. Credit-monitoring procedures are not
physically invasive, do not involve follow-up visits or tests, and rarely produce "false positives"-results that are erroneously misleading.' This Part
explores the analogy between credit-monitoring damages and medicalmonitoring damages in further detail.
A.

Exposure Thresholdfor Recovery

Plaintiffs cannot recover medical-monitoring damages in cases of insignificant exposure to toxic chemicals."' Similarly, courts should not
award credit-monitoring damages if only a trivial breach of data security
occurred. The relevant Latin maxim is de minimis non curat lex, a phrase

Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 717 (citations omitted) (quoting Elam, 765 S.W.2d at 209).
Graves, supra note 5, 1 12, at 9-10 (footnotes omitted).
Id. 121, at 16 (noting that, with respect to medical monitoring, many "procedures are invasive
and carry health risks that must be weighed against the procedures' potential benefits" and "there are
risks that patients may take false reassurance from the monitoring, or that false positives could lead to
unnecessary, costly, or dangerous follow-up procedures").
136 See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d. Cir. 1990) (requiring that a plaintiff be "significantly exposed to a proven hazardous substance" in order to establish a cause of action for
medical-monitoring damages).
133
134
135
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that reflects a principle that applies broadly throughout American jurisprudence. Literally translated, it means "[t]he law does not concern itself with
trifles."' 37 In the field of torts, this means that a person who is unable to
prove actual losses is rarely able to recover an award of nominal damages."' Instead, a plaintiff ordinarily must demonstrate a significant injury to
his or her personal interests before the law will grant a remedy. ' Courts
usually overlook mere technical interference with another's rights."
The de minimis principle suggests that it is appropriate for judges to
apply a threshold requirement in cybersecurity litigation when deciding
whether to award credit-monitoring damages. The courts should permit a
plaintiff who would not otherwise suffer actual losses from a data-security
breach to recover credit-monitoring costs only if the defendant has seriously
exposed the plaintiff's personal data to the risk of identity theft to the extent
that a reasonably prudent person would incur credit-monitoring costs. Presumably, whether the plaintiff has crossed the threshold for recovery will
depend on various factors relating to the nature of the breach. According to
one formulation:
The factors used in determining whether remedial measures are reasonably necessary include
the likelihood of future harm, whether a plaintiff (or her data) has been exposed, how much
of the risk of future harm comes from the exposure instead of from other sources, and the
cost-effectiveness of remedial measures.141

It may be useful to differentiate between intentional and negligent
breaches of security. The former category includes hacking, theft of information or equipment, and misrepresentations deliberately made to obtain
data.142 In contrast, the latter category encompasses such things as loss of
computers, hardware, or media containing data, unintentional exposure of

137 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 496 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "de minimis non curat lex").
138 See VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 51 (4th ed. 2009)

(indicating that nominal damages are normally available only in actions involving the five intentional
torts which descended from the writ of trespass).
139 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 377,

at 1047 (2000).

140 See, e.g., United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44, 53 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[T]he mere detention of mail
not in his custody or control amounts to at most a minimal or technical interference with his person or
effects, resulting in no personal deprivation at all."), aff'd, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
141 Graves, supra note 5, 36, at 25-26. According to one court discussing medical monitoring:
In determining the reasonableness and necessity of monitoring, the following factors are relevant: (1) the significance and extent of the plaintiff's exposure to chemicals; (2) the toxicity
of the chemicals; (3) the relative increase in the chance of onset of disease in the exposed
plaintiff as a result of the exposure, when compared to (a) the plaintiff s chances of developing the disease had he or she not been exposed, and (b) the chances of the members of the
public at large of developing the disease; (4) the seriousness of the disease for which the
plaintiff is at risk; and (5) the clinical value of early detection and diagnosis.
Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824-25 (Cal. 1993) (en banc).
142 GAO REPORT, supra note 96, at 19 (discussing intentional breaches of data security).
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data on the Internet, and improper disposal of data.'43 In American tort law
generally, courts routinely extend liability further in cases involving intentionally tortious conduct than in suits based on mere negligence.'"
In some cases, proof that a hostile action caused the cybersecurity
breach will establish the seriousness of data exposure. 4 S Thus, if a thief
steals a laptop containing social security numbers,'" it is easier to conclude
that affected data subjects are at an increased risk of identity theft, than if
the owner merely lost or misplaced the laptop.'47 The same may be true if
an unauthorized person opened a new bank account using an affected data
user's social security number soon after the security breach occurred'48 or if
a renegade employee with access to thousands of patient files actually sold
some of that information to an identity theft ring.'49 In contrast, if a server
containing customers' information is only one of many items of hardware
that thieves took and no evidence exists that the thieves had any interest in
the data rather than the hardware, it may be difficult to conclude that the
plaintiffs have reached the exposure threshold for an award of creditmonitoring damages.5 o
143 Id. (discussing negligent breaches of data security).
144 See, e.g., Ross v. Holton, 640 S.W.2d 166, 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) ("In the area of intentional
torts a submissible punitive damages question is made for the jury once the plaintiff has presented
sufficient evidence of legal malice-the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or
excuse." (citing Pollack v. Brown, 569 S.W.2d 724, 733 (Mo. 1978) (en banc))).
145 Cf EMU Probes Security Breach of Student Data, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. I1, 2011, at 3A (discussing a situation where "[n]ames, birth dates, and Social Security numbers were improperly accessed
by two former student employees" who improperly transmitted that information); Editorial, supra note
29 (discussing the theft of customers' names and e-mail addresses).
146 Cf Garnett v. Millennium Med. Mgmt. Res., Inc., No. 10 C 3317, 2010 WL 5140055, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2010) (involving the theft ofa portable hard drive during a burglary).
147 See Giordano v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, No. 06-476 (JBS), 2006 WL 2177036, at *5 (D.N.J. July
31, 2006) (denying recovery of credit-monitoring damages based on lack of standing, and noting that
"Plaintiff failed to allege even that her financial information was stolen or ended up in the possession of
someone who might potentially misuse it. . . . [and] merely alleges that a version of her personal financial information was lost"); see also Graves, supra note 5, 131, at 23 ("[S]ome courts have imported the
'exposure' question into data loss cases by requiring plaintiffs to show that their data was either
(a) acquired or (b) misused by a third party, as opposed to merely lost."); id. 1 65, at 47 ("A plaintiff
who seeks monitoring costs following a hacking-related breach probably has a greater chance of suffering identity fraud than a plaintiff who sues after a laptop is lost; their claims should not be treated the
same.").
148 See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2010) (involving similar
facts). The court stated in the context of a standing inquiry that "[w]ere Plaintiffs-Appellants' allegations more conjectural or hypothetical-for example, if no laptop had been stolen, and Plaintiffs had
sued based on the risk that it would be stolen at some point in the future-we would find the threat far
less credible." Id. at 1143.
149 Burstein, supra note 87 (indicating that the hospital offered one year of free credit monitoring
to 44,000 patients after the information of some patients had been sold).
150 See Stollenwerk v. Tri-W. Health Care Alliance, 254 F. App'x 664, 665 (9th Cir. 2007) (denying credit-monitoring damages on these facts).
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Similarly, credit monitoring's appropriateness may be a factor of the
time period for which the defendant exposed the plaintiff s data to wrongful
third-party access and the ease with which third parties could achieve
access. A court has a stronger basis to conclude that a data subject is at a
heightened risk for identity theft if the defendant negligently posted personal information on the Internet or in another public location for a period of
months,"' than if the information was accessible for only six days and no
evidence exists that anyone actually accessed or misused the data.'52 The
same is true if third persons could freely access personal information on the
.web rather than obtain it only via a password and login."'
Finally, in some cases, it may be appropriate to take into account the
nature of personal information at issue in determining whether courts
should award credit-monitoring damages. The loss of data linking a person's name, social security number, and birth date is undoubtedly more
serious than the loss of data involving only a name and e-mail address.' 54
It is not possible to state a precise rule defining the threshold for an
award of credit-monitoring damages. In any given case, many factors may
be relevant. On the one hand, courts should not permit an award of creditmonitoring damages in cases where there is no significant threat that the
affected data subjects will become victims of identity theft. On the other
hand, an award of credit-monitoring damages should not hinge upon the
plaintiffs showing that the intruder actually misused sensitive personal
information. "
151 Kirtley, supra note 23, at 29 (discussing a data security breach at a university where patient
information was improperly posted on the Internet for twenty months); Jaymes Song, APNewsBreak:
University Posts Info of 40K Students, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.boston.com/news/
education/higher/articles/2010/10/29/apnewsbreak universityposts info of 40k students/ (stating that
"Social Security numbers, grades and other personal information of more than 40,000 former University
of Hawaii students were posted online for nearly a year before being removed" because a faculty member studying student success rates uploaded the material to what he believed was a secure server).
152 See In re Davis, 430 B.R. 902, 907 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2010) (finding that the plaintiff lacked
standing to recover credit-monitoring damages for alleged harm resulting from improper exposure of
data for six days). The court noted that the "Plaintiff's need for credit monitoring is conjectural or hypothetical." Id.
153 See In re Matthys, No. 09-16585-AM-13, 2010 WL 2176086, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. May 26,
2010) (rejecting an invasion of privacy claim related to a court filing that improperly disclosed a social
security number).
154 Cf Allison v. Aetna, Inc., No. 09-2560, 2010 WL 3719243, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2010)
(denying relief on federal standing grounds and noting that "[e]ven assuming that the hackers obtained
Plaintiff's email address, it is highly speculative that they obtained any other information that would be
necessary to commit identity theft"); Editorial, supra note 29 (discussing the theft of customer names
and e-mail addresses).
155 Cf In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 851 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that, in the
medical-monitoring context, "the appropriate inquiry is not whether it is reasonably probable that plaintiffs will suffer harm in the future, but rather whether medical monitoring is, to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty, necessary in order to diagnose properly the warning signs of disease").
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In Caudle v. Towers, Perrin,Forster & Crosby, Inc.,'"' a federal court
in New York dismissed a negligence claim seeking credit-monitoring damages.'17 In that case, a thief stole password-protected laptops from a pension
consultant's office.'" The court held that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a rational basis for serious concerns about the personal information
contained on the laptops.'" As the court explained:
Factors giving rise to a demonstrable basis for a serious concern over misuse may include
evidence of the following: (1) the [lack of] any password-protection for use of the computer
such that an unsophisticated user could boot the computer and immediately access the file;
(2) that the person stealing the hard drive was motivated by a desire to access the data and
had the capabilities to do so; or (3) actual access or misuse of information of the plaintiff or
another person whose data was stored on the same hard drive. This Court cannot say with
confidence that New York would recognize a claim if any or all of these elements were met.
However, the Court can comfortably conclude that New York would not allow a claim to
proceed where none of these elements are present.160

B.

Reasonably Necessary

The critical question is whether, based on the facts of a case, creditmonitoring expenditures are reasonably necessary. In this regard, courts
should give considerable weight to community practices. If a cybersecurity
breach involves the type of facts that commonly prompt businesses to offer
credit monitoring to affected persons,' 6 1 courts to approve settlements including compensation for credit monitoring, 62 or governmental entities to
provide for or require the provision of credit-monitoring services or reimbursement for such expenses,163 there should be little question about the
reasonable necessity of such expenditures.
While it is important to consider whether credit-monitoring expenditures are cost-effective, it is unreasonable to expect courts to engage in the
type of economic analysis that will yield a convincing mathematical answer
to this question. Estimates about the risks and costs of identity theft are
simply too various to produce convincing results." Calculations often unreasonably discount or ignore very real considerations, such as the emotional distress, inconvenience, and lost time that result from breaches of

156
157
158

580 F. Supp. 2d 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Id.
at 275-76.
Id. at 282.

159
160

Id.
Id.

161 See supra Part I.B.
162 See supra Part II.C.
163 See supraPart II.D.
164 For one such effort, see Graves, supra note 5, I 79-82, at 56-58.
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data security.'" Judges can better assess whether expenditures on credit
monitoring are cost-effective by reference to what businesses, courts, and
governmental agencies actually do rather than by judicial calculations seeking to quantify the wisdom of credit monitoring through economic analysis.
In Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Health Care Alliance,'" the Ninth Circuit
concluded the expenditures on credit monitoring were not reasonably necessary because the plaintiffs could have reviewed their credit reports for
free and could have placed a fraud alert in their files."' However, a once-ayear free credit report' 8 is no substitute for daily credit monitoring to detect
the opening of unauthorized accounts and "a fraud alert is only available for
ninety days, unless the victim has already suffered fraud." 69 Stollenwerk's
conclusion that there was "no showing that a normally prudent person in,
these circumstances would have taken precautions beyond the free services" is at odds with recent developments.' 70 There is now abundant evidence
showing that businesses,"' courts,17 and government agencies"7 often authorize expenditures on credit monitoring, even though affected data subjects could obtain free credit reports each year from credit-reporting agencies and place fraud alerts in their file that would be effective for a limited
period of time.
C.

Durationof Monitoring

Medical-monitoring precedent recognizes that the length of time during which monitoring is appropriate varies with the facts of a case. 1' Courts
must consider the toxicity of the chemical or other matter at issue, the
length of the plaintiffs exposure, and the foreseeable period during which
165 See, e.g., id. 1 55, at 39 (discussing attempts to calculate average loss incurred by fraud victims
as measured by "out-of-pocket losses" alone (footnote omitted)).
166 254 F. App'x 664 (9th Cir. 2007).
167 Id at 667.
168 The Fair Credit Reporting Act requires each of the nationwide consumer reporting companiesEquifax, Experian, and TransUnion-to provide persons with a free copy of their credit report, upon
request, once every twelve months. Facts for Consumers, FED. TRADE COMMISSION,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edulpubs/consumer/credit/cre34.shtm (last modified Aug. 24, 2010.
169 Graves, supra note 5, 77, at 55.
170 Stollenwerk, 254 F. App'x at 667.
171 See supra Part II.B.
172 See supra Part II.C.
173 See supra Part II.D.
174 See Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 716 So. 2d 355, 361 (La. 1998) ("[T]o ensure that
only meritorious claims are compensated, plaintiff's recovery of medical monitoring costs must be both
reasonable and limited in duration to the maximum latency period (if known) of the diseases for which
there is an increased risk."); see also Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp. 869, 884 (S.D. Ohio 1994) ("The extent
and duration of diagnostic monitoring is a matter for medical professionals under the supervision of the
court to decide.").
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resulting symptoms of disease or injury may be latent."' Based on particular facts, a longer period of monitoring may be more appropriate in one case
than in another.
Similarly, the length of time that credit monitoring should continue
depends on the circumstances. Exposure of highly sensitive personal information, such as social security and bank account numbers for a long period
of time, will undoubtedly call for longer monitoring than brief exposure of
less significant information. However, there is no binding rule. In some
cases, the one or two years of credit monitoring that a potential defendant
offers may be all that the facts warrant."' In other cases, it may be reasonable to continue monitoring for a longer period of time.'77 Little more can be
said than that, whatever the period, the plaintiff must prove that the proposed length of time for monitoring is reasonably necessary."' Of course,
courts will likely greet claims seeking compensation in the form of lifetime
monitoring with skepticism,17 except in the rarest case.
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST RECOVERY
An important hurdle to overcome in recovering credit-monitoring
damages is convincing a court that the victim of a serious cybersecurity
breach suffers a legally cognizable injury even before the perpetrator steals
his or her identify.'o Not all courts are willing to accept this proposition,
and some courts operate under the misconception that a claim for creditmonitoring damages is a request for compensation for increased risk of

175 See Bourgeois, 716 So. 2dat360-61.
176 Cf Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 380 F. App'x 689, 691 (9th Cir. 2010) (indicating that
although "California courts have not considered whether time and money spent on credit monitoring as the result of the
theft of personal information are damages sufficient to support a negligence claim," the court did not
need to reach that question because the plaintiff "failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact on
whether he suffered damages because he offered no evidence on the amount of time and money he spent
on the credit monitoring, or that Gap's offer would not fully recompense him").
177 Cf Bourgeois, 716 So. 2d at 361 (stating that medical-monitoring costs should be based on the
"maximum latency period ... of the diseases for which there is an increased risk").
178 Cf In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 851 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that, in the
medical-monitoring context, "concerns about the degree of certainty required can easily be accommodated by requiring that a jury be able reasonably to determine that medical monitoring is probably, not
just possibly, necessary"); Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 102 A.D.2d 130, 137 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984) (indicating that expenses for medical monitoring are recoverable as consequential damages "provided that plaintiffs can establish with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that such expenditures
are 'reasonably anticipated' to be incurred by reason of their exposure").
179 See Caudle v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 273, 281 n.2, 283-84
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (rejecting a negligence claim seeking lifetime monitoring damages).
180 See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 406 F. App'x 129, 131 (9th Cir. 2010) (supplemental opinion).
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harm.' This Part explains that credit-monitoring damages are preventive
expenditures that are wholly distinct from both the unwieldy concept of
increased risk of harm (which is not a proper basis for measuring damages
in a cybersecurity case) and from the harm that results if a data-security
breach ultimately causes identity theft. In addition, this Part argues that,
contrary to the holdings of some cases, standing principles should not control the compensability of credit-monitoring damages because issues of
standing and damages are legally distinguishable. Finally, this Part contends that courts have no basis to hold that plaintiffs cannot recover creditmonitoring damages from negligent defendants simply because they can
purchase credit monitoring for themselves in order to self-protect against
the harm that breaches of cybersecurity cause.
PresentInjury Versus IncreasedRisk of Harm

A.

A number of cases have held that plaintiffs cannot recover creditmonitoring damages because, until identity theft occurs, a data subject affected by a cybersecurity breach has not suffered an injury.18 For example,
in Rowe v. UniCareLife & Health Insurance Co.,183 the plaintiff sought to
recover credit-monitoring costs and other damages when the defendants
temporarily posted personal information on the Internet." In addressing
those claims, a federal court in Illinois decided several legal issues in the
plaintiffs favor and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss.' However,
with respect to the claim for credit-monitoring damages, the court wrote:
[F]ederal courts have accepted the increased risk of future harm as an injury and allowed for
the recovery of future damages. If Rowe is able to show an increased risk of future harm, the
Court may admit evidence regarding the cost of credit monitoring services in order to calcu181 See Rowe v. UniCare Life & Health Ins. Co., No. 09 C 2296, 2010 WL 86391, at *7 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 5, 2010).
182 See, e.g., Krotiner, 406 F. App'x at 131 (stating, in an action arising from the theft of a laptop
containing employee information, which raised issues related to credit monitoring, that the "mere danger
of future harm, unaccompanied by present damage, will not support a negligence action" (quoting
Gazija v. Nicholas Jerns Co., 543 P.2d 338, 341 (Wash. 1975) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 783 (W.D. Mich.
2006). In Hendricks, the plaintiff sued not for negligence, but for breach of contract and violation of the
Michigan Consumer Protection Act. Id. at 780-81. In denying recovery of credit-monitoring damages,
the court noted that Michigan does not permit recovery of medical-monitoring damages, writing:
There is no existing Michigan statutory or case law authority to support plaintiffs position
that the purchase of credit monitoring constitutes either actual damages or a cognizable loss.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that Michigan's highest court would reject a novel legal
theory of damages which is based on a risk of injury at some indefinite time in the future.
Id. at 783.
183 No. 09 C 2296, 2010 WL 86391 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2010).
184
185

Id. at*1.
Id at *9.
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late the damages that can be attributed to that increased risk. Nonetheless, the costs of credit
monitoring services are not a present harm in and of themselves. Instead, they may be useful
in the evaluating some cognizable future harm.s 6

This line of reasoning misses the point. In cases of breached data security, the defendant must incur the costs of credit monitoring to minimize the
special threat of economic- harm resulting from data exposure, regardless of
whether identity theft ever occurs. As such, credit-monitoring expenses are
independent of, and distinguishable from, whatever harm may mature in the
future if a perpetrator ultimately misuses the personal data placed at risk.
Credit-monitoring costs are not merely a factor in valuing increased risk of
harm.
1.

Two Categories of Harm

To put the matter somewhat differently, it is useful to segregate the
damages resulting from data exposure into two categories: first, costs that
plaintiffs reasonably incur to prevent identity theft when defendants seriously breach data security, and second, costs resulting from identity theft.
Expenses falling within the first category include the costs of credit monitoring and certain out-of-pocket expenditures, such as replacing drivers'
licenses, changing account numbers, and ordering new checkbooks. If there
is credible evidence of a serious data-security breach,' the defendant
should incur these types of expenses because they minimize the likelihood
of future economic harm. This is especially true because such expenditures
are typically modest in comparison to the harm that can result from identity
theft.
In contrast, expenses falling within the second category, namely losses
resulting from identity theft, are intended not to prevent harm that the plaintiff can avoid by the exercise of reasonable care, but to redress harm already proximately caused. If the plaintiff has accrued such losses prior to
trial, the plaintiff should be able to recover them. However, such evidence
is often unavailable because the risk of identity theft has not yet come to
fruition. In that case, courts should deny compensation for damages relating
to the second category because it is a matter of speculation whether identity
theft will ever occur, and the law routinely denies recovery for damages not
proven with reasonable certainty.'" There is no reason to follow a different
rule in cybersecurity cases.
Courts should focus on the two specified categories of damages (costs
incurred to prevent harm and costs resulting from identity theft) and reject
186 Id. at*7.
187 See supra Part IllI.A (discussing the threshold for recovery of credit-monitoring damages).
188 E.g., Landry v. Spitz, 925 A.2d 334, 347 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
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the idea that cybersecurity cases provide compensation for increased risk of
harm. Increased risk of harm is an unworkable measure for damages in
these types of cases because there is no way to estimate with reasonable
precision the degree to which data exposure increases the risk of identity
theft.
2.

Contrast to Loss of a Chance

A useful contrast can be drawn by reference to the concepts of increased harm (alternatively known as "loss of a chance"' 89 ) that have crystallized in the field of medical-malpractice liability. Many courts permit a
patient harmed by a physician's negligence to recover compensation for an
increased risk of harm.'" For example, this may include the increased
chance of dying that results from negligent failure to detect or disclose a
diseased condition which, though capable of treatment, grows more severe
as a result of delayed attention."' Courts award increased-risk-of-harm
damages because generally accepted scientific principles have made it possible to calculate percentage increases in the chances of harm with reasonable precision. 92 For example, in Matsuyama v. Birnbaum,'" the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts recognized the loss of chance doctrine and
held that "[i]n order to prove loss of chance, a plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the physician's negligence caused the
plaintiffs likelihood of achieving a more favorable outcome to be diminished."'" Explaining the operation of the doctrine, Chief Justice Margaret
H. Marshall wrote:
We reject the defendants' contention that a statistical likelihood of survival is a "mere possibility" and therefore "speculative." . . . [S]urvival rates are not random guesses. They are estimates based on data obtained and analyzed scientifically and accepted by the relevant medical community as part of the repertoire of diagnosis and treatment, as applied to the specific
facts of the plaintiff s case.... The key is the reliability of the evidence available to the fact
finder.... [F]or certain conditions, medical science has progressed to the point that physicians can gauge a patient's chances of survival to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,
189 See Alberts v. Schultz, 975 P.2d 1279, 1281, 1283 (N.M. 1999) (recognizing the "loss of a
chance" doctrine and stating that "[s]ome courts seek to clarify the theory by use of the term 'increased
risk of harm"' (quoting Gardner v. Pawliw, 696 A.2d 599, 613 (1997))).
190 See, e.g., Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 403 (N.J. 1990).
191 See O'Brien v. Stover, 443 F.2d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 1971).
192 See Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 828 n.23 (Mass. 2008). The court observed that:
The highest courts of at least twenty States and the District of Columbia have adopted the
loss of chance doctrine. . . . Ten States' high courts have, in contrast, refused to adopt the
loss of chance doctrine. . . . Other States' high courts have not addressed the issue or have
explicitly left the question open. The Draft Restatement discusses loss of chance but 'takes
no position on this matter, leaving it for future development and future Restatements'.
Id. (citations omitted).
193 890 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 2008).
194 Id. at 83 2.
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and indeed routinely use such statistics as a tool of medicine. ... The availability of such expert evidence on probabilities of survival makes it appropriate to recognize loss of chance as
a form of injury.195

However, the Matsuyama court was quick to point out the limits of a
doctrine permitting recovery in a tort action for increased risk of harm. The
court cautioned: "[O]ur decision today is limited to loss of chance in medical malpractice actions. . . . [because] reliable expert evidence establishing
loss of chance is more likely to be available in a medical malpractice case
than in some other domains of tort law."1 96
In contrast to the field of medical services, there are no established
scientific principles that can quantify increased risk of identity theft in cybersecurity cases. Consequently, it is inappropriate for courts to base compensation in such cases on increased risk of harm. Rather, courts should
award damages only for losses that the plaintiff can prove with reasonable
certainty. In many instances, credit-monitoring costs and other measures
intended to prevent identity theft are reasonable, appropriate, and foreseeable consequences of a defendant's negligent failure to protect data from
unauthorized access or to promptly disclose a security breach. 97 In some
instances, it is also possible to establish, with reasonable certainty, losses
that resulted from identity theft linked to unprotected personal data. 9 8 However, courts should not award damages for mere increased risk of harm in
cases where identity theft has not occurred.
3.

Differentiating Damages from Standing

It is important to distinguish proof of damages from standing to litigate
in federal court. Article III's "case" or "controversy" requirement necessiId. at 833-34.
Id at 834-35.
For example, when Sony's PlayStation Network was hacked, resulting in 77 million accounts
being jeopardized, Sony attempted to "win back customers ... with free credit monitoring." Sony Offers
Credit
Monitoring
to
Playstation
Network
Customers,
MYCREDITSPECIALIST.COM,
http://blog.mycreditspecialist.com/2011/05/l /sony-offers-credit-monitoring-to-playstation-networkcustomers/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2011); see also Patrick Klepek, PSN Hacked: What Sony's Security
Breach Means for You (And What Comes Next), GIANT BOMB (Apr. 27, 2011),
http://www.giantbomb.com/news/psn-hacked-what-sonys-security-breach-means-for-you-and-whatcomes-next/3092/. One customer stated that Sony's offer of credit monitoring "is the single biggest item
in Sony's apology" which will help prevent its customers from falling prey to "phishing scams, attempted address changes . .. and other chicanery for years to come." Sony to Offer Help with Credit
Monitoring, GAMEWIT (May 1, 2011, 1:36 AM), http://gamewit.blogs.pressdemocrat.com/13485/sonyto-offer-help-with-credit-monitoring/.
198 Johnson, supra note 1, at 299-300 (explaining how out-of-pocket damages are "susceptible to
proof with a high degree of certainty" because the plaintiff can introduce receipts as evidence of expenses).
195
196
197
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tates proof of injury in fact.'" As explained in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:200
[O]ur cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains
three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical."' Second, there must be a causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be "fairly ... trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of
some third party not before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "spe20
culative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision." 1

In federal cybersecurity litigation, courts have addressed the Constitutional standing requirement. Thus, in Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp,202
Judge Kenneth F. Ripple wrote for the Seventh Circuit:
Many . . . cases have concluded that the federal courts lack jurisdiction because plaintiffs
whose data has been compromised, but not yet misused, have not suffered an injury-in-fact
sufficient to confer Article III standing. We are not persuaded by the reasoning of these cases. As many of our sister circuits have noted, the injury-in-fact requirement can be satisfied
by a threat of future harm or by an act which harms the plaintiff only by increasing the risk
of future harm that the plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent the defendant's actions.
We concur in this view. Once the plaintiffs' allegations establish at least this level of injury,
the fact that the plaintiffs anticipate that some greater potential harm might follow the defendant's act does not affect the standing inquiry. 20 3

Cases decided subsequent to Pisciottahave generally reached the same
conclusion, 2M although there is authority to the contrary. 205 However, for
present purposes, the critical point is that federal issues related to standing
are different and properly distinguishable from state-law issues related to
tort damages.206 Whether or not an increased risk of identity theft gives one
199

200
201
202
203
204

U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1.
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
Id. at 560 (second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth alterations in original) (citations omitted).
499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 634 (footnotes omitted).
See, e.g., Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that allega-

tions that the theft of a laptop subjected thousands of employees to an increased risk of future identity
theft was sufficient to establish injury-in-fact standing).
205 See Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1051-52 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (finding
that the plaintiff lacked standing because the alleged injury was not "imminent" but noting that otherwise "[s]ubsequent to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Pisciotta, district courts have consistently determined that claims of increased risk of identity theft resulting from security breaches sufficiently allege
an injury-in-fact to confer Article III standing to those persons bringing such claims"); In re Davis, 430
B.R. 902, 907 (D. Colo. 2010) (finding that the plaintiff lacked standing because the harm resulting
from improper exposure of data for six days was not "actual" or "imminent" where there was no evidence that the data was "accessed or misused" (first and second internal quotation marks omitted)).
206 See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 406 F. App'x 129, 131 (9th Cir. 2010) (supplemental opinion)
(citing Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 624-25 (2004)).
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standing to assert a cybersecurity claim should not depend on whether a
plaintiff can recover damages for increased risk of harm under state law. It
also should not mean that credit-monitoring expenditures are not a compensable form of loss resulting from a security breach.207 Moreover, parties
do not litigate all cybersecurity cases in federal court.208 To that extent, federal court precedent on standing is unlikely to present a useful guide to resolve state-law issues related to tort damages.
B.

Self-ProtectionAgainst This Type ofLoss

The American Law Institute's project on tort liability for economic
loss is now in abeyance, and none of the project's drafts were ever approved.2" However, Council Draft No. 2 proposed that there should be no
liability for negligently-caused, pure economic loss if "the claimant reasonably could have, by contract with the actor or through an intermediary, protected itself from the loss."1210 Thus, in assessing the compensability of credit-monitoring damages, it is fair to ask whether the courts should bar recovery for this form of loss because, before the cybersecurity breach occurred, the plaintiff could have bargained with the defendant about what
damages he or she could recover. In addition, a separate, but related, question is whether a potential plaintiff is foreclosed from recovering creditmonitoring costs in cybersecurity tort actions when the plaintiff had the
ability to self-protect against unauthorized use of personal information by
purchasing credit-monitoring services.

207 See id. (holding, in a cybersecurity action, that although the plaintiffs "pled an injury-in-fact
for
purposes of Article III standing" they did not "adequately [plead] damages for purposes of their statelaw claims"). But see Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 08 Civ. 6060(RMB)(RLE), 2010
WL 2643307, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010) (finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing, and, if they
had standing, they would also be unable to prove damages).
208 See supraPart 11.
209 The American Law Institute states:
The Council approved the start of the project in 2004. Thus far, no part of the work has been
approved by the Council or by the membership. Professor Mark Gergen resigned as the
project's Reporter in late 2007; the project is in abeyance while the Director seeks a successor Reporter.
Johnson, supra note 57, at 535 n.60 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting material previously
posted at Current Projects: Restatement Third, Torts: Liability for Economic Harm, AM. L. INST.,
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.projip&projectid=15). Although work on the Restatement (Third) of Torts has been underway for roughly twenty years, and many parts have been completed, numerous important subjects remain to be addressed. See Vincent R. Johnson, The Vast Domain
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, I WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 29, 29-35 (2010), available at
http://lawreview.law.wfu.edu/files/2011/01/Johnson Forum.pdf (surveying challenges relating to the
unfinished work).
210

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ECON. TORTS & RELATED WRONGS

Draft No. 2, 2007).

§ 8(3)(c)(i)

(Council
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In thinking about these questions, it is useful to note that the proposed
Restatement language changed during the drafting process. The first draft
submitted to the American Law Institute Council in October 2006 proposed
that there should be no liability for negligence that causes pure economic
loss if "the claimant could have obtained redress for the harm from the actor by contract with the actor or through an intermediary."21 1 However, the
Reporter revised that same provision in the second Council draft in October
2007 by inserting the word "reasonably." The second Council draft proposed that there should be no liability for negligently caused pure economic
loss if "the claimant reasonably could have, by contract with the actor or
through an intermediary, protected itself from the lOss."1212 The insertion of
the word "reasonably" was significant in terms of the sweep of the proposed provision. That word narrowed the range of cases in which hypothetical contract remedies would limit recovery in tort cases for pure economic
losses to only those cases where it would have been reasonable under the
existing circumstances for the plaintiff to seek contractual protection. By
including the word "reasonably," the proffered Restatement rule no longer
reflected a broad preference for contract remedies in any case in which a
contract remedy might be theoretically possible. Rather, the revised rule,
framed in terms of reasonableness, would have "separate[d] tort and contract claims by encouraging parties to allocate risk contractually" 213 only in
the range of cases where contractual protection was reasonably feasible.
1.

Not a Proper Subject for Bargaining

As noted earlier, the language of state security breach notification laws
strongly suggests that the data-protection and the breach-disclosure obligations that they impose are not a proper subject for bargaining between data
possessors and data subjects.214 Agreements that vary those duties are normally void as against public policy. 215
Of course, bargaining about remedies is not the same as bargaining
about duties. Nevertheless, the fact that bargaining about cybersecurity duties may be futile is a good basis for concluding that a reasonable person
would not bargain about related cybersecurity remedies. To that extent,
Id. §8(4)(c)(i). The draft stated that:
(4) An actor who unintentionally (and without dishonesty or disloyalty) causes pure economic loss is not subject to negligence or strict liability in tort for the loss . .. when . . .(c) liability is unnecessary to deter the conduct or avoid or redress the harm because (i) the claimant
could have obtained redress for the harm from the actor by contract with the actor or through
an intermediary ....

211

Id.
212
213
214
215

Id. § 8(3)(c)(i) (emphasis added).
City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 12 Mass. L. Rptr. 225, 231 (Super. Ct. 2000).
See supra Part 1.C.2.
See supra Part I.C.2.
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contracting with a defendant is not a reasonable alternative for protecting
oneself against the costs of credit monitoring that are made reasonably necessary by a breach of cybersecurity.
Furthermore, because data about any given person is held by a large
and ultimately unpredictable range of entities, it would be unreasonable to
expect persons to bargain with all possible defendants over liability for credit-monitoring damages. In that case, "[c]onsumers would spend an inordinate amount of resources on efforts to perform often duplicative, timeconsuming tasks relating to assessment of the risks of injury and the need
for economic protection."216
In assessing whether bargaining provides a reasonable option for a potential plaintiff to safeguard economic interests, it is important to consider
the relative economic positions of the parties. Such facts bear upon the issue of whether the plaintiff had adequate bargaining power to make contractual protection a reasonablepossibility.
Where the defendant, acting from a position of economic advantage,
deals with the plaintiff on a "take it or leave it basis," bargaining for remedies related to breaches of cybersecurity may not be feasible. For example,
many cybersecurity breaches have involved unauthorized access to university alumni records.217 A graduate of a university might theoretically succeed in bargaining with the university to remove his or her name from some
database on a take it or leave it basis, such as by purging the graduate's
name from the mailing lists for the university magazine or fundraising. But
it seems fanciful to suggest that the graduate could negotiate with the university over the availability of credit-monitoring damages for losses that
may occur if the graduate remains on those lists. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that, under any circumstances, the graduate could reach a bargain
with the university obliging the latter to remove the graduate's name from
its academic records databases, or to pay for credit monitoring if a perpetrator breaches the security of those records.
2.

Collateral Sources and Causation Principles

Theoretically, one might argue that plaintiffs should not recover credit-monitoring damages because potential plaintiffs could obtain creditmonitoring insurance for themselves prior to any unauthorized intrusion
into or revelation of their data. A federal court in Michigan spotted, but did
not explore, this issue. In denying recovery of credit-monitoring damages
216 Vincent R. Johnson, Liberating Progress and the Free Market from the Specter of Tort Liability, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 1026, 1042 (1989) (book review).
217 White Paper, An Examination of Database Breaches at Higher Education Institutions, at 1,
http://www.appsecinc.com/techdocs/whitepapers/Higher-Ed-Whitepaper-Edited.pdf (last visited Sept.
20, 2011).
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under breach of contract and deceptive trade practices theories, the court
observed that "perhaps it would be prudent for everyone to monitor their
credit."218
However, even if one assumes that it is unreasonable for a potential
plaintiff not to buy credit-monitoring protection as a matter of course, that
failure should have no bearing on the defendant's liability for creditmonitoring expenditures for at least two reasons. First, the collateral-source
rule,219 which is still widely followed outside of the medical-malpractice
context,220 holds that the fact that the plaintiff has insurance does not reduce
the defendant's liability.22 ' To hold otherwise would undercut the incentive
for persons to self-protect against the costs of accidents. When persons purchase insurance, they intend to protect their own interests and not the interests of potential defendants.
Second, a plaintiff's failure to purchase credit-monitoring services
should not be treated as a form of contributory negligence, comparative
negligence, or comparative fault.222 For conduct to constitute a defense
within those categories, it must have unreasonably multiplied the chances
that the injury for which recovery is sought would occur.223 Unlike jaywalking into a busy street or using a defective electrical appliance in a wet location, the failure to purchase credit-monitoring insurance does not multiply
218
219

Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 779 (W.D. Mich. 2006).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. c, at 514 (1979) ("The rule that collateral
benefits are not subtracted from the plaintiff's recovery applies to . . . [i]nsurance policies, whether
maintained by the plaintiff or a third party."); see also Christian D. Saine, Note, Preserving the Collateral Source Rule: Modern Theories of Tort Law and a Proposalfor Practical Application, 47 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1075, 1119 (1997) ("Many states have not changed the traditional rule and some that have
changed it have had the statute overturned by state supreme courts.").
220 See Kenneth S. Abraham, What Is a Tort Claim? An Interpretation of Contemporary Tort
Reform, 51 MD. L. REV. 172, 190-91 (1992) (stating that the collateral source rule is a "traditional rule"
but has been abolished in numerous jurisdictions in medical malpractice cases). While "firmly entrenched in the American jurisprudence of the law of damages for over a century," the collateral source
rule has been the source of debate for many scholars. Nora J. Pasman-Green & Ronald D. Richards Jr.,
Who Is Winning the Collateral Source Rule War? The Battleground in the Sixth Circuit States, 31 U.
TOL. L. REV. 425, 425-26 (2000).
221 See Joseph M. Perillo, The Collateral Source Rule in Contract Cases, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
705, 706 (2009) (stating that under tort principles, "damages assessed against a tortfeasor generally are
not diminished by any payments received by the injured party from medical insurance, pension and
disability plans, or any sources other than the tortfeasor or the tortfeasor's insurer").
222 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 138, at 19-20 (differentiating contributory negligence, comparative negligence, and comparative fault).
,
223 A defendant seeking to base a defense on the plaintiffs negligence must prove that the alleged
negligence

was

of the plaintiffs injuries. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
(2000) (discussing "Proof of Plaintiffs Negligence and Legal Causa-

a legal cause

APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB.

§4

tion"). The same causation rules apply in evaluating the conduct of plaintiffs and defendants. Id § 4
cmt. d. A "defendant's conduct can never be a factual cause unless the chances of harm to the plaintiff
have been multiplied." VINCENT R. JOHNSON, MASTERING TORTS: A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF

TORTS 117 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing Reynolds v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 37 La. Ann. 694 (1885)).
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the chances of an accident. Failure to subscribe to credit monitoring does
not make a breach of cybersecurity more likely.
V.

THE CASE FOR CREDIT-MONITORING DAMAGES

There are strong arguments in favor of holding data possessors liable
for credit-monitoring damages in cases involving negligently caused
breaches of information security. As explained below, these arguments fall
into two broad categories. The first deals with effective deterrence of deficient data practices.224 The second concerns efficient allocation of the economic losses that inevitably arise from the widespread use of digital personal information in contemporary life.
A.

DeterrenceofDeficient DataPractices

Defendants who are not held accountable for the losses they negligently cause often have an insufficient incentive to exercise care and thereby
minimize the costs of preventable harm. This is as true with respect to data
possessors as it is with regard to other putative defendants. Moreover, it is
as true concerning losses resulting from inadequate data security as it is
with damages arising from threats of physical injury. However, tort law can
play an important role in deterring unnecessary losses. It does this by providing a legal mechanism through which those who neglect to exercise care
are called to account for harm that they could have avoided.
At various times, courts have imposed liability for the purpose of deterring negligent data practices. For example, in Remsburg v. Docusearch,
Inc.,225 a man purchased information about a woman's workplace address
from an Internet-based investigation service, then went to that location and
killed her.226 In a subsequent wrongful death action, the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire held that a private investigator or information broker who
sells information to a client pertaining to a third party has a duty to the third
party to exercise reasonable care in disclosing that information.227 The court

224 That such deficiencies exist is beyond dispute. See, e.g., Doran, supra note
122 ("33 percent of
medical practices said they did not conduct a security risk analysis of their electronic health
records ..... ). In particular, law firms have been slow to recognize cybersecurity threats and reluctant
to disclose information about data security breaches. See Karen Sloan, Firms Slow to Awaken to Cybersecurity Threat, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 8, 2010, at 5 (indicating that law firms may be targeted not just by runof-the-mill hackers but by "advanced persistent threats," spying for a long period of time to obtain
information about business or litigation strategies (internal quotation marks omitted)).
225 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003).
226 Id. at 1005-06.
227 Id. at 1007.
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intended for the decision to deter the type of careless data-related practices
that create risks of stalking and identity theft.22 8
Similarly, in Wolfe v. MBNA America Bank,229 a federal court in Tennessee held that a bank has a duty "to implement reasonable and costeffective verification methods that can prevent criminals, in some instances,
from obtaining a credit card with a stolen identity."230 The decision was
rooted in concerns about deterring unnecessary economic losses. As the
court explained:
With the alarming increase in identity theft in recent years, commercial banks and credit card
issuers have become the first, and often last, line of defense in preventing the devastating
damage that identity theft inflicts. Because the injury resulting from the negligent issuance of
a credit card is foreseeable and preventable, the Court finds that under Tennessee negligence
law, Defendant has a duty to verify the authenticity and accuracy of a credit account applica23
tion before issuing a credit card. 1

1.

Precautions and Activity Levels

Subjecting potential defendants to liability for the losses that their enterprises cause not only influences what steps those persons take to ensure
that an activity does not cause harm, but also the selection of activities in
which those persons choose to engage. That is, the risk of liability influences both the choice of precautions and activity levels. For example, "[a]
data handler could. . . prospectively limit its exposure to litigation not only
by handling data carefully, but also by limiting the number of people about

whom it collects data." 232
In some instances, the implementation of precautions is sufficient to
reasonably minimize the chances that certain losses will occur. However, if
the exercise of care cannot effectively manage risks, the threat of liability
may cause an actor to decide that the activity is not worth undertaking.
Risky technologies or practices may be eschewed in favor of other modes
of doing business.

228 See id. at 1008 ("The threats posed by stalking and identity theft lead us to conclude that the
risk of criminal misconduct is sufficiently foreseeable so that an investigator has a duty to exercise
reasonable care in disclosing a third person's personal information to a client.").
229 485 F. Supp. 2d 874 (W.D. Tenn. 2007). After the defendant bank issued a credit card bearing
the plaintiffs name to an unauthorized person at an address where the plaintiff never lived, the cardholder then ran up charges that exceeded the card's limit and failed to pay. Id. at 878-79. After demanding payment from the plaintiff and being informed that he was the victim of identity theft, the bank
notified a credit-reporting agency that plaintiff's account was delinquent. Id. at 879. That caused a
potential employer to reject the plaintiff for ajob because of his poor credit score. Id.
230 Id. at 882.
231 Id.
232 Graves, supra note 5, 37, at 27.
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For example, a business subject to liability for the loss of computerized information might guard against that risk by encrypting the information of data subjects. If encryption is too inconvenient or expensive, the
company might eliminate practices that pose a particular risk of harm, such
as by prohibiting employees from taking laptops with unencrypted information away from the business premises. Similarly, the risk of liability may
convince a business not to make computerized personal information accessible to company employees via the web because the risk of hacking is just
too great. Alternatively, a company may decide that it should purge, rather
than retain, outdated files containing personal information.233
2.

Internalization of Costs

In some instances, the law can promote deterrence by compelling potential defendants to internalize the costs of their endeavors. In other words,
the courts use liability to reconcile burdens with benefits. 2 3 Under this approach, persons cannot keep the profits of an endeavor while simultaneously avoiding responsibility for resulting losses. A person who enjoys the
benefits must also bear the costs. This is why courts will hold employers
liable for the torts of employees occurring within the scope of employment;2 1 possessors of animals liable for bites and other attacks; 23 6 and contractors liable for damages resulting from the use of dynamite in excavation.237
However, as presently configured, American law often allows data
possessors to escape responsibility for the losses resulting from their negligent data practices.238 Yet, data possessors frequently reap the benefits of
233 Cf Editorial, supra note 29 (recommending federal adoption of a data security policy
imposing
"maximum periods for retaining personal data").
234 See, e.g., Jones v. Manhart, 585 P.2d 1250, 1252 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (stating
that strict liability applies to dog owners, regardless of whether the owner has knowledge of "the vicious propensities
of the animal"); JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 138, at 7-8 (explaining that the idea that "[t]hose who
benefit from dangerous activities should bear resulting losses" has played an important role in the shaping of modern tort law (emphasis omitted)).
235 See, e.g., Phila. & Reading R.R. Co. v. Derby, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 468, 485-87 (1853) (applying
the principle of respondeat superior to a railroad company); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04
(2006) (discussing respondeat superior).
236 See, e.g., Manhart,585 P.2d at 1252; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &

EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 22-23 (2010) (discussing liability for harm caused by wild and domestic animals).
237 See, e.g., Starkel v. Edward Balf Co., 114 A.2d 199, 201 (Conn. 1955) ("The
explosion of
dynamite is an intrinsically dangerous means. Hence, one who explodes dynamite acts at his peril."
(citation omitted)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM

§ 20

& cmt. e (2010) (discussing liability for harm caused by abnormally dangerous activities).
238 Similar conclusions have been reached by a Canadian author. See Chandler, supra note 55, at
272 ("There is evidence that existing regulatory and market sanctions are insufficient to deter careless
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assembling, preserving, and using digital personal information.239 Imposing
liability for credit-monitoring damages will help to ensure that data possessors will internalize the costs that are incidental to their practices. To that
extent, they are more likely to engage in honest calculations of whether
those practices are worthwhile and carried on in a way that reasonably minimizes the risk of losses associated with breaches of cybersecurity. 2 4
With respect to liability for medical-monitoring damages, the Third
Circuit explained:
Medical monitoring claims acknowledge that, in a toxic age, significant harm can be done to
an individual by a tortfeasor, notwithstanding latent manifestation of that ha.. . . Allowing
plaintiffs to recover the cost of this care deters irresponsible discharge of toxic chemicals by
defendants and encourages plaintiffs to detect and treat their injuries as soon as possible.
These are conventional goals of the tort system as it has long existed . . . .241

The same analysis applies to recovery of credit-monitoring damages in
a digital age where delayed detection of identity theft arising from breaches
in cybersecurity can cause significant harm. Imposing liability for the costs
of credit monitoring will deter negligent data practices and facilitate prompt
detection of the opening of unauthorized accounts.
In Texas, state records showed that prior to a massive breach of data
security, "information technology departments shrank by 20 percent, saw
high employee turnover and faced heavy productivity demandssometimes at the expense of security."24 2 Ultimately, a public outcry forced
the responsible state agency to offer free credit monitoring to millions of
persons.243 Courts should consider whether a reduced investment in data
security is "penny wise and pound foolish."
behaviour in many cases."). Some sources focusing on the United States offer high estimates of costs
arising from breaches of data security. See Edward Murray, Breaches, POST MAG., Jan. 13, 2011, at 18,
18. According to the Ponemon Institute in Michigan:
[E]ach compromised customer record costs companies a little over $200 . . . and includes
outlays for detection, escalation, notification and response along with legal, investigative and
administrative expenses, customer defections, opportunity loss and reputation management. ... [and] costs associated with customer support such as information hotlines and credit monitoring subscriptions.
Id.; see also PONEMON INST., 2009 ANNUAL STUDY: COST OF A DATA BREACH 4-5 (2010), available at

http://www.ponemon.org/locallupload/fckjail/generalcontent/1 8/file/USPonemonCODB_09_012209
sec.pdf.
239

See Brian Azcona, Transaction-Generated Data, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVACY 562, 564

(William G. Staples ed., 2007).
240 See Chandler,supra note 55, at 273 ("The recognition of potential liability in negligence might
assist by forcing careless custodians of personal information to internalize the very real costs of their
carelessness .. . .").
241 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990).
242 Kelley Shannon, Combs StaffSwamped Before Data Breach, DALL. MORNING NEWS, May 14,
2011,at IA.
243 Hart, supra note 92 (discussing the offer and surrounding circumstances).
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Efficient Allocation ofLosses

Efficient allocation of costs often can minimize the economic burdens
associated with injury-producing products and practices, such as the losses
associated with defective consumer goods.2" One approach is to the shift
the loss to the "cheapest cost avoider"245 and, thereby, reduce the magnitude
of the loss. Another, often complementary, approach is to distribute the loss
among a broad class of persons, such as all those who benefit from the injury-producing product or practice, so that no one suffers the full weight of
the loss and many persons each bear a minor share thereof.24
The concepts of loss-shifting247 and loss-spreading248 are sometimes
controversial. Nevertheless, they have played an important role in the shaping of modern American tort law.249 They could be equally significant re244 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS:

A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS 134, 163-65 (1970) (discussing methods of allocating accident costs to reduce the total impact of accidents and injuries).
245 The concept of cheapest cost avoider (sometimes framed in the rubric of "least cost avoider") is
an established feature of law-and-economics scholarship. See, e.g., HENRY N. BUTLER & CHRISTOPHER
R. DRAHOZAL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 319 (2d ed. 2006). Judicial opinions occasionally
discuss this topic. Thus, in a case dealing with liability for allegedly negligent marketing and distribution of handguns, a federal court in New York found that as "[a]s between a negligent handgun manufacturer and an injured bystander, the former must be regarded as the 'cheapest cost avoider."' Hamilton
v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 827 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated sub. nom. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001). The cheapest cost avoider principle has been influential in the shaping of modem American tort doctrine. For example, it has been said that "[tlhe product liability action
for breach of warranty is an action in strict liability, not based on fault, allocating a risk of loss for
policy reasons to the cheapest cost avoider." Schneider Nat'l, Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561,
580, 587 (Wyo. 1992). However, it was probably an overstatement for the Fifth Circuit to write that
"[m]odem negligence principles are to a large extent designed to place liability on the party who is the
cheapest cost avoider or cheapest insurer." Rankin v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 762 F.2d 444, 448 n.4
(5th Cir. 1985). Many factors have shaped modern American tort law, including, among others, fault,
proportionality, deterrence, efficient loss allocation, administrative convenience, predictability, and
respect for the actions of co-equal branches of govemment. See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 138, at 710 (discussing the policy foundations of tort law). However, in some tort cases, courts have held that the
cheapest cost avoider principle is decisive. For example, the Ninth Circuit held in a public nuisance
action "that the defendants are under a duty to commercial fisherman [sic] to conduct their drilling and
production in a reasonably prudent manner so as to avoid the negligent diminution of aquatic life"
because the defendants were "unmistakably ... the best cost-avoider." Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501
F.2d 558, 569-70 (9th Cir. 1974) (extensively discussing the economic theories of Guido Calabresi).
246 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 138, at 8 (discussing loss-spreading and the idea that those
who benefit from activities should bear any losses that result).
247 See id. (discussing the idea that "[t]he costs of accidents should be shifted to those best able to
bear them" and how this can minimize the economic burden of accidents (emphasis omitted)).
248 See id. (discussing the idea that "[t]he costs of accidents should be spread broadly" and noting
that "[I]osses can be spread not only through increases in the costs of goods and services, but through
other devices such as taxation and insurance" (first emphasis omitted)).
249 Id.
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garding allocation of credit-monitoring costs that plaintiffs incur due to
data-security breaches. By taking advantage of the economies of scale, it is
reasonable to conclude that large data possessors, such as banks, universities, and national retailers can purchase credit-monitoring coverage for data
subjects cheaper than those persons could purchase coverage for themselves.250 Moreover, in many instances, the costs of credit monitoring can be
spread to some or all of the persons who benefit from a data possessor's
activities. This may reduce the magnitude of the burden that must be carried.
For example, if a data possessor has 100,000 customers, and information relating to one hundred of those customers is subject to unauthorized
access, the costs of monitoring the credit of the one hundred affected data
subjects can be spread among all of the data possessor's customers. The
burden will not fall exclusively on those who happened to be among the
unlucky one hundred. Thus, if the use of computerized information makes a
business more effective or efficient, the costs related to such productivity
will be spread among those who potentially benefit from that efficiency.
CONCLUSION

In recent years, expenditures on credit monitoring have become common. Today, it is often the case that potential cybersecurity defendants voluntarily provide such services to affected data subjects;25 that courts approve settlements where compensation for credit monitoring is a large part
of class-action recoveries;252 and, that judicial and administrative sanctions
order provision of credit monitoring or reimbursement for expenditures on
such services.253 These developments, all of which are relatively new, cloak
expenditures on credit monitoring with the indicia of legitimacy2 " and provide compelling grounds for courts to consider, afresh, the issues relating to
whether a negligent data possessor can be held liable for the costs of credit
monitoring.

250 See In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 3:08-MD-01998, 2009
WL 5184352, at *8, *11 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 22, 2009) (calculating the cost of two years of credit monitoring provided in-kind at $37); Comparison of Credit MonitoringServices, supra note 18 (showing that
the cost of credit monitoring, when purchased by an individual, can range from $8.95 to $29.95 per
month); see also Learn Strategiesfor Managing Cyber Risk, supra note 95, at 16 (stating that annual
costs for credit monitoring offered by a data possessor in cases of security breach "can range from $20
to $100 per person").
251 See supra Part I.B.
252 See supra Part I.C.
253 See supra Part II.D.
254 See supra Part II.E.
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Expenditures on credit monitoring are a reasonable and necessary response to any serious breach of data security, 255 and therefore, compensation for such amounts should normally be available. A persuasive analogy
can be drawn between credit monitoring and the awards for medical monitoring that many states permit in cases of toxic exposure involving threats
to personal health.256 However, even in the absence of such precedent, ordinary tort principles provide justification for credit-monitoring awards as
reasonably necessary expenditures intended to mitigate damages.
The so-called economic loss rule should not bar recovery of creditmonitoring damages because the data protection obligations imposed under
state data-security laws are not a proper subject for bargaining between data
possessors and data subjects. 257 Any agreements purporting to diminish the
data-protection obligations imposed by relevant statutes 258 are likely to be
void as against public policy. Likewise, the fact that identity theft may have
not yet occurred is no reason for courts to deny the recovery of creditmonitoring expenditures.259 Such an award is intended to compensate affected data subjects not for an increased risk of future harm, 2 ' but for the
reasonable and necessary costs of minimizing the risks of identity theft
through protective detection of the opening of unauthorized new accounts
in the victim's name. 261 If negligence has factually and proximately caused
a serious breach of cybersecurity, plaintiffs should recover those costs regardless of whether identity theft ever takes place.
Holding data possessors responsible for credit-monitoring costs will
further the deterrence interests of the law by forcing data possessors to implement reasonable precautions and avoid unnecessarily risky practices.262
Moreover, placing the cost of credit monitoring on data possessors will, at
least in the case of businesses, often shift the costs of credit monitoring to
the cheapest cost avoider and, typically, spread the costs of data use to a
broad class of persons will who benefit from the businesses' activities.263
Consequently, in a wide range of circumstances, recovery of creditmonitoring damages is appropriate. Compensation for such expenditures is
consistent with sound community practices, basic legal principles, and the
important public policies relating to deterrence and efficient loss allocation.
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